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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation consists of three individual chapters. Chapter 1 documents that  
market responds negatively to dividend cuts and positively to dividend increases. Chapter 
2 finds that firms hierarchally cut dividends and repurchases to meet their investment, or 
capital expenditure needs. Based on the analysis of Chapters 1 and 2, Chapter 3 discusses 
the discrepancy between firms and the market when firms adjust dividends, and shows 
that firms take advantage of this discrepancy to buy back shares. 
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CHAPTER 1 
MARKET RESPONSES TO DIVIDEND ADJUSTMENTS 
 
1.1. Abstract 
Literature has documented that market respond negatively to dividend cuts and 
positively to dividend increases, but most researchers examine this phenomena either at 
intraday level or at annual level. Our research analyzes the market responses to dividend 
adjustments at quarterly level, namely, from -4 to 4 quarters surrounding the quarter of 
adjustments. We find that at quarterly level, market responses are quantitatively 
consistent with the findings at intraday level and annual level: (1) market responds 
negatively to dividend cuts and positively to dividend increases; (2) small firms have 
more information asymmetry, and their share prices are more sensitive to dividend 
adjustments; (3) market responses are not symmetric to dividend cuts and increases. The 
findings are consistent with the literature. Our research is complimentary to the current 
literature, and lend supports to the findings of Xiang and Lence (2016). 
1.2. Introduction 
Stock market responds negatively to dividend cuts and positively to dividend 
increases. This phenomena has been extensively analyzed. Most researchers investigate 
the abnormal return in the short run, usually in a 2- or 3-day window (Dhillon and 
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Johnson 1994). Some researchers also examine the abnormal return in the long run, or 
price drifts, from one year to three years (Michaely, Thaler, and Womack 1995). 
We investigate the price changes due to dividend adjustments in the middle run, 
from 2 to 9 quarters. We find that at quarterly level, market responses are quantitatively 
consistent with the findings at intraday level and annual level: (1) market responds 
negatively to dividend cuts and positively to dividend increases; (2) small firms have 
more information asymmetry, and their share prices are more sensitive to dividend 
adjustments; (3) market responses are not symmetric to dividend cuts and increases. The 
findings are consistent with the literature. Our research is complimentary to the exiting 
literature, and lends direct support to Xiang and Lence (2016) which assume that market 
responses to dividend adjustments are quantitatively consistent at intraday, quarterly, and 
annual level.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we briefly review the 
literature about how market responses to the dividend adjustments, and the possible 
explanations. Section 3 describes the data, models, and methods. In section 4 we analyze 
the results. Finally, we draw conclusions in section 6.  
1.3. Literature Review 
Researchers have well documented how market responds to dividend adjustments. 
Most of them focus on the short term abnormal returns after a dividend adjustment. For 
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example, Dhillon and Johnson (1994) show that the abnormal return is -2.01% for a 
dividend cut and 0.98% for a dividend increase in a two-day window. Grullon, Michaely, 
and Swaminathan (2002) find cumulative abnormal returns of -3.71% for a dividend cut 
and 1.34% for a dividend increase in a three-day window.  
Some researchers examine this phenomena from a long time horizon. For example, 
Michaely and Womack (1995) document that the first year excess return is 7.5%, and the 
accumulated three year excess return is 24.8% after a dividend initiation (an extreme case 
of dividend increase). In addition, they find that the market response is not symmetric. 
The first year excess return is -11.0%, and the accumulated three year excess return is 
-15.3% after a dividend omission, which is different from the case of dividend initiation 
in the magnitude.  
After the dividend adjustment, the evolution of prices in the long run is complex. 
Some researchers find evidence for overreaction or mean reversion in prices. For 
example, De Bondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) document that firms with the most extreme 
price performance over 3 to 5 years tend to exhibit a mean-reverting process in excess 
returns. Again, this phenomena is not symmetric: the losers show a stronger mean 
reverting pattern than the winners. 
The literature provides various explanations for the price reactions to and evolutions 
after dividend adjustments. The signaling hypothesis states that information asymmetry 
exists between the market and firms. Dividend adjustments send signals to the market to 
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mitigate the asymmetry (Nissim and Ziv 2001). The information contained can be past 
earnings (Koch and Sun 2004) and future earnings (Nissim and Ziv 2001, Liljeblom, 
Mollah, and Rotter 2015), but either way, the market responses are in the same direction 
of dividend adjustments.  
Other explanations include the agency cost hypothesis and clientele hypothesis. The 
agency cost hypothesis postulates that an increase in dividends reduces the agency costs 
thus increases the firms’ present value (DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner 2009). The 
clientele hypothesis (Kawano 2013) suggests that some clientele have a special 
preference to dividends such as institutional investors and retirees. Some institutional 
investors can only invest in dividend-issuing stocks because of the “Prudent rule”, and 
the retirees prefer to receiving cash dividends periodically (Fracassi 2008). Although 
these explanation varies, they are all consistent with the observed facts: market responses 
and dividend adjustments co-move in the same direction. Therefore, firms may use steady 
dividends to establish better access to equity market (Gan and Wang 2014). 
 
1.4. Data and methods 
We use Compustat quarterly data from 1993 through 2012, for a total of 80 quarters. 
The variable construction is as same as Xiang and Lence (2016). Size is measured by 
assets (ATQ, item 44). Market-to-book ratio (MB) equals market assets 
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(ATQ-CEQQ+CSHOQ*PRCCQ, item 44-item 59+item 61*item 13) divided by lagged 
assets. Leverage ratio is debt (DLTTQ+DLCQ, item 51+item 45) divided by lagged 
assets. We follow the well-established approach used by Fama and French (1992), and 
group the stocks into 3x3 = 9 portfolios with the same number of observations according 
to lagged firm size and MB. The definitions of portfolios are as follows. 
 
 
Small & 
low MB 
Small & 
blend 
Small & 
high 
MB Mid & 
low MB 
Mid & 
blend 
Mid & 
high 
MB Large & 
low MB 
Large & 
blend 
Large & 
high 
MB  
To examine the market responses to dividend adjustments, we use two methods, 
namely, the benchmark method (Michaely, Thaler, and Womack, 1995) and the 
autoregressive method (Campbell and Ammer 1993).  
1.4.1. The benchmark method 
The benchmark method examines the excess returns of the stock. The definition of 
excess returns is as follows (Michaely, Thaler, and Womack, 1995). 
 
   
           
        
 
                               
S
m
all to
 larg
e
 
Low to high MB 
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where t = -4, ..., -1, 0, 1,…,4;      is the equally-weighted portfolio return based on the 
size-MB grouping method (9 portfolios);                   denotes the excess return of 
stock j (belongs to portfolio p) at t quarters after the dividend adjustments. We use 
equally-weighted instead of value-weighted portfolio returns because we are interested in 
the behavior of individual stocks. By adopting equal weights, we avoid having portfolio 
returns dominated by the largest firms, as would be the case if weights were based on 
firm size. 
1.4.2. The autoregression method 
At stock level, returns usually follow an autoregressive process (Campbell and 
Ammer 1993, Lamoureuc and Lastrapes 1990). The model is as follows: 
                                                       
where              and              denote dummy variables of dividend cuts and 
increases respectively. Coefficients    and    measure the return shocks after dividend 
cuts and increases. The stock price is measured by the quarterly close price, which is after 
the dividend distribution. Therefore,           is the return after dividend adjustments, 
and            is the return before the adjustments.  
1.4.3. The return change method 
Xiang and Lence (2016) find dividend adjustments affect firms’ share repurchase 
decisions. For small, low-leverage, and low-MB firms, repurchases move with dividends 
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in the same direction, while for large, high-leverage, and high-MB firms, repurchases 
move in the opposite direction of dividend adjustments. The rationale is that dividend 
adjustments lead to price fluctuations. To lend more direct support to Xiang and Lence 
(2016), we follow them and partition the sample into three groups with the same number 
of firms for each of the following firm characteristics: size, MB, and leverage ratio, and 
examine the return changes 4 quarters before and after dividend adjustments. Then we 
examine the return changes surrounding the dividend adjustments. The definition of 
return changes is as follows. 
                                   
where t=0 denotes the quarter when a dividend cut or increase occurs, and k=-4, …-1, 
1,…4 denotes the quarters before and after the dividend adjustments.  
 
1.5. Results 
Table 1.1 presents the results of the benchmark method. In 7 out of the 9 cases, the 
average returns are significantly below the corresponding benchmark by 1.84% to 6.72% 
at the 1% significant level after a dividend cut (panel A) . In 7 out of the 9 cases, the 
average returns are significantly above the corresponding benchmark by 0.6% to 8.8% at 
the 1% or 5% significant level after a dividend increase (panel B).  
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We plot the results of table 1.1 in figures 1.1 to 1.6 to show the dynamics. Clearly, 
for dividend cuts (figures 1.1-1.3), the majority of bottoms occur at quarter 0, i.e., right 
after the dividend cuts; for dividend increases (figures 1.4-1.6), the majority of the peaks 
occur at quarter 0, i.e., right after the dividend increases. In addition, the curves become 
smoother as the stock style goes larger, which shows that small stocks are more sensitive 
to dividend adjustments. The reason is that small firms have more information 
asymmetry problems than the large firms, and the market relies more on the dividend 
adjustments to mitigate the asymmetry problems. We also find that low-MB (high-MB) 
stocks are more likely to show higher (lower) excess returns than their benchmarks 
before and after the dividend adjustments, but the reason is unclear. 
Table 1.2 reports the results of autoregressive methods. To avoid the effect of 
outliers, we winsorize the estimated coefficients        . at 0.005 level. The results are 
similar to the benchmark method. The coefficients of d_div_cut are significantly negative 
(-2.19% to -6.18%) with t>1.64 in 6 out of the 9 cases, and the coefficients of d_div_inc 
are significant positive (1.29% to 4.34%) in 8 out of 9 cases. In addition, in 6 out of 9 
pairs, the market is more sensitive to dividend cuts than to dividend increases. These 
stocks are small-low, small-high, mid-low, large-low, large-blend, and large high stocks. 
This is consistent with the findings of Michaely, Thaler, and Womack (1995): the market 
responses are not symmetric. 
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The results of the return change method are plotted in figures 1.7-1.12. Typically, 
the returns in the quarter of dividend cuts are at the bottom of the valley, especially for 
firms with more information asymmetry. For example, the average returns are at the 
lowest point for the small/cut category (figure 1.7). For firms with less information 
asymmetry, the returns at t=0 are (almost) at the bottom, but all their valleys show a 
flatter bottom. These flat bottoms indicate that the market is less sensitive to the cuts, but 
it is still a good time to buy shares as Xiang and Lence (2016) suggest.  
The cases of dividend increases are similar. The curves of returns are bell-shaped, 
with the peaks at or almost at t=0, showing that it is not a good time to repurchase. Again, 
the bell curves with peaks at t=0 are more typical and significant for firms with more 
information asymmetry than for those with less information asymmetry. 
The analysis above shows that assumption in Xiang and Lence (2016) is sound. 
Share prices decrease after a dividend cut and increase after a dividend increase, not only 
in a 2- or 3-day window, but also at a quarterly level. In addition, information asymmetry 
plays an important role to determine how sensitive the prices are. 
 
1.6. Conclusion 
We show that at quarterly level, market responses are quantitatively consistent with 
the findings at intraday level and annual level: (1) market responds negatively to dividend 
10 
 
 
 
cuts and positively to dividend increases; (2) small firms have more information 
asymmetry, and their share prices are more sensitive to dividend adjustments; (3) market 
responses are not symmetric to dividend cuts and increases. They are more sensitive to 
cuts than to increases.  
Literature have examined the stock performance after dividend adjustments in the 
short run (over a few days) and the long run (over a few years). Our research examines 
the stock performance in the middle run, i.e., at quarterly level, and is complementary to 
the literature. After immediate price shocks, the market responses at least several quarters. 
The initial market responses are insufficient, leaving room for later price drifts (Michaely, 
Thaler, and Womack 1995). But the price mean-reverting process in the long run 
indicates that market over responds to the dividend adjustments (De Bondt and Thaler 
1987). The under reaction in the short run and the over reaction in the long run, combined 
with our findings, suggest that it might take several quarters for the market to reach its 
intrinsic values from the systematic mispricing, and then fluctuates around the intrinsic 
values. Finally, our research lend support to Xiang and Lence (2016) by providing some 
direct evidence in support of their assumptions. 
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Appendix 
Figures 1.1-1.3: Excess returns surrounding dividend cuts (benchmark method) 
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Figure 1.1:  Dividend Cuts for Small Firms 
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Figure 1.2:  Dividend Cuts for Middle firms 
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Figure 1.3:  Dividend Cuts for Large Firms 
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Figures 1.4-1.6: Excess returns surrounding dividend increases (benchmark 
method) 
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Figure 1.4:  Dividend Increases for Small Firms 
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Figure 1.5:  Dividend Increases for Middle Firms 
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Figure 1.6:  Dividend Increases for Large Firms 
Large-low MB 
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Figures 1.7-1.12: Returns Surrounding Dividend Cuts and Increases ( the return 
change method) 
Quarter 0 is the quarter that dividend cuts or increases occur. 
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Figure 1.8 
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low_mb/cut high_mb/cut 
-6.0% 
-4.0% 
-2.0% 
0.0% 
2.0% 
4.0% 
6.0% 
8.0% 
10.0% 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
Return 
Quarter 
Figure 1.9 
Returns Surrounding Dividend Cuts 
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Figure 1.10 
Returns Surrounding Dividend Increases 
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Table 1.1  Excess returns from t=-4 to t=4 (benchmark method) 
  
Panel A Dividend Cuts     
 
quarter -4 quarter -3 quarter -2 Quarter -1 Quarter 0 Quarter 1 Quarter 2 Quarter 3 Quarter 4 
Small-low MB 3.73%*** 4.56%*** 5.60%*** 5.19%*** 0.53% 0.91% 3.37%*** 3.39%*** 2.40%*** 
Small-blend 2.92%*** 4.24%*** 5.05%*** 5.87%*** 1.42% 1.42% 2.57%** 3.14%*** 0.05% 
Small-high MB -3.37%** -2.61%* -4.18%*** -2.06% -6.72%*** -1.41% -1.45% 0.34% -3.53%** 
          Mid-low MB 2.55%*** 3.61%*** 1.72%*** 0.45% -3.46%*** 0.61% 2.25%*** 1.17%** 2.43%*** 
Mid-blend 1.01%* 0.2% 0.68% 0.38% -1.89%*** 0.06% 2.28%*** 1.07%* 1.28%** 
Mid-high MB -1.76%** -1.88%** -1.89%*** -2.53%*** -2.19%*** -1.86%** -1.43%** -2.05%*** -2.30%*** 
          Large-low MB 0.37% 0.46% -0.27% -1.80%*** -3.05%*** 0.28% 1.32%*** 0.77%* 1.88%*** 
Large-blend -0.08% -0.61% -1.01%** -1.90%*** -1.84%*** 0.31% 0.34% 0.43% -0.11% 
Large-high MB -1.31%*** -1.47%*** -1.57%*** -0.92%** -2.21%*** -1.01%** -0.83%* -0.61% -0.90%** 
          
Panel B Dividend Increases     
 
quarter -4 quarter -3 quarter -2 Quarter -1 Quarter 0 Quarter 1 Quarter 2 Quarter 3 Quarter 4 
Small-low MB 6.00%*** 4.87%*** 4.96%*** 7.57%*** 8.11%*** 4.04%*** 3.50%*** 4.37%*** 3.76%*** 
Small-blend 6.32%*** 4.59%*** 5.17%*** 5.82%*** 8.80%*** 4.12%*** 2.39%*** 2.43%*** 3.76%*** 
Small-high MB 0.11% -2.85%** -0.31% -0.42% 2.51%** -4.75%*** -2.32%* -3.56%*** -0.64% 
          Mid-low MB 5.38%*** 4.27%*** 5.29%*** 5.72%*** 7.00%*** 2.60%*** 2.72%*** 1.90%*** 1.33%*** 
Mid-blend 2.57%*** 2.34%*** 2.58%*** 2.76%*** 3.14%*** 0.70%* 0.46% 0.37% 0.69%* 
Mid-high MB -1.14%*** -2.16%*** -0.86%** -0.71%* -0.74%* -1.98%*** -2.01%*** -2.95%*** -2.95%*** 
          Large-low MB 3.64%*** 3.13%*** 3.09%*** 3.15%*** 3.47%*** 1.54%*** 0.82%*** 0.59%** 0.49%* 
Large-blend 0.88%*** 0.50%** 0.54%*** 0.64%*** 0.60%*** -0.69%*** -0.78%*** -0.61%*** -0.67%*** 
Large-high MB -0.60%*** -0.94%*** -1.14%*** -0.88%*** -0.33%* -1.44%*** -1.72%*** -1.69%*** -1.61%*** 
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Table 1.2  Excess Returns at t=0 (auto regression method) 
Panel A Dividend Cuts 
Stock style Mean Median Sd. N t 
Small-low MB -5.51%*** -4.40% 22.55% 211 -3.55  
Small-blend -1.60% -2.02% 24.52% 237 -1.00  
Small-high MB -5.22%* -3.36% 26.65% 79 -1.74  
      Mid-low MB -6.18%*** -5.45% 22.31% 756 -7.62  
Mid-blend -1.76% -1.79% 22.10% 364 -1.52  
Mid-high MB 0.48% -0.08% 20.26% 321 0.43  
      Large-low MB -6.10%*** -5.30% 22.93% 704 -7.05  
Large-blend -4.49%*** -3.33% 20.98% 973 -6.68  
Large-high MB -2.19%** -1.35% 18.87% 349 -2.17  
Total -4.14%*** -3.36% 21.97% 3994 -11.91  
        
Panel B Dividend Increases 
Stock style Mean Median Sd. N t 
Small-low MB 4.34%*** 3.37% 20.12% 189 2.97  
Small-blend 4.25%*** 2.81% 24.07% 272 2.91  
Small-high MB -2.14%*** -0.48% 24.43% 102 -0.89  
      Mid-low MB 3.81%*** 3.26% 19.24% 730 5.35  
Mid-blend 1.68%* 1.03% 20.76% 563 1.93  
Mid-high MB 1.33%* 0.63% 20.10% 628 1.66  
      Large-low MB 2.34%*** 1.91% 17.64% 713 3.55  
Large-blend 1.29%*** 1.07% 15.33% 1526 3.29  
Large-high MB 1.54%*** 1.53% 15.03% 835 2.96  
Total 2.02%*** 1.53% 18.17% 5558 8.30  
2
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Table 1.3  Return changes at t=0 (return change method) 
           
    Return change =                      
        
           
        
 
t=0 when a dividend cut or a dividend increase occurs 
 
                    
  
After dividend cuts 
 
After dividend increases 
Groups   Mean Std.Dev t_Statistics Obs   Mean Std.Dev t_Statistics Obs 
           
Small 
 
-4.73%** 21.61% -3.17 210 
 
0.64% 22.52% 0.57 410 
Large 
 
0.68% 25.11% 1.03 1419 
 
-0.10% 20.80% -0.48 9861 
           
Low MB 
 
-0.23% 24.24% -0.31 1092 
 
-0.90% 21.15% -1.88 1946 
High MB 
 
-2.57%* 24.23% -2.19 427 
 
0.28% 21.49% 0.92 5140 
           
Low Leverage 
 
-2.84%** 22.79% -3.15 640 
 
1.19%** 22.39% 3.01 3189 
High Leverage 
 
0.32% 26.07% 0.37 891 
 
-0.91%* 20.85% -2.62 3602 
           
Aggregate   -0.40% 25.10% -0.78 2404 
 
-0.17% 21.33% -0.92 12831 
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CHAPTER 2   
EXTERNAL FINANCIAL RESTRICTIONS AND INTERNAL FINANCIAL 
FLEXIBILITY: HOW DO FIRMS CUT PAYOUTS TO FINANCE 
INVESTMENT 
 
2.1. Abstract 
This paper quantitatively analyzes how firms cut various payouts to finance their 
investments. Payouts have two different forms  dividends and repurchases. 
Repurchases are more flexible than dividends in terms of timing and dollar magnitudes. 
To undertake investments, firms show a hierarchy of payout cut behaviors: they are more 
likely to cut repurchases, and are not likely to cut dividends unless cutting repurchases 
does not meet their needs. Furthermore, firms’ preference for payout cuts is affected by 
their accessibility to external financial sources. Small firms, high-leverage firms, and 
young firms have more difficulty accessing external finance sources. Therefore, they rely 
more on payout cuts to finance investments. These firms are more likely to cut 
repurchases or cut both repurchases and dividends. In contrast, large firms, low 
leverage-ratio firms and mature firms are less relient on payout cuts to finance 
investments. The results are robust to changes in the measurements of investments and 
repurchase cuts. In extreme circumstances, e.g., in the late 2000s crisis, firms rely more 
on all kinds of payout cuts to finance their investments.  
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2.2. Introduction 
Investments and payouts are two major issues in corporate finance and have 
received intense scrutiny in the literature. Research on investments usually focuses on 
how firms make investment decisions, and how the investment is financed (e.g., Doms 
and Dunne 1998); studies on payouts mainly attempt to explain why, how, how much, 
and when firms pay out (DeAngelo et al., 2009). However, most research has examined 
the two activities separately, whereas firms may consider them simultaneously. In fact, 
investments and payouts interact with each other via the channel of budget constraints. In 
addition, when scholars examine the relationship between payouts and investments, they 
do not differentiate between the two forms of payout: They either focus on dividends, 
ignoring repurchases (for example, Danis et al., 2011), or add them together as a total 
payout (for example, Whited 2006).  
Dividends and repurchases affect investment in different ways. In particular, 
dividends are sticky, whereas repurchases are much more flexible than dividends in both 
timing and dollar magnitudes(DeAngelo et at., 2009). Cutting dividends is not as easy as 
cutting repurchases. This situation can be even more complex when taking other factors 
into account. For example, when external finance opportunities are very limited, firms 
may be forced to cut both dividends and repurchases. In contrast, when the stock price is 
perceived to be significantly undervalued, which may be the case for small firms, firms 
may prefer to cut dividends over cutting repurchases. Therefore, treating repurchases in 
the same way as dividends may lead to biased conclusions. This bias maybe exaggerated 
when repurchases are more prominent, as they have become since the late 1990s (see 
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figure 2.1)
1
. If regulators make decisions based on incorrect inference, they may not get 
desired results. 
Analyzing the relationship between payout and investment by differentiating 
between repurchases and dividends is a brand-new research area. We rigorously examine, 
for the first time, how firms cut various payouts to finance their investments. Our 
research should help  government regulators and firm managers make better decisions. 
Besides, it may help explain why sometimes firms’ behaviors are consistent with the 
pecking order theory instead of the trade off theory. The pecking order theory states that 
firms prefer internal finance to external finance because the cost of internal funds is 
(always) lower than the cost of external funds. On the contrary, the trade off theory 
asserts that firms trade off between the benefits and costs of both external and internal 
finance, and choose the optimal financing method, usually a combination of both. Our 
research shows that small, young, and high-leverage firms’ behaviors are more consistent 
with the pecking order theory because they have less external financial opportunities, 
leading to higher external financing cost. 
Specifically, our paper find firms show a hierarchy of payout cut behaviors To 
undertake large lumpy investments. They are more likely to cut repurchases, and are not 
likely to cut dividends unless cutting repurchases does not meet their needs. Furthermore, 
firms’ preference for payout cuts is affected by their accessibility to external financial 
sources. Small firms, high-leverage firms, and young firms have more difficulty 
accessing external finance sources. Therefore, they rely more on payout cuts to finance 
investments. These firms are more likely to cut repurchases or cut both repurchases and 
                                                   
1
 In the early 1980s, aggregate repurchase yield was only 1/10 of aggregate dividend yield, while in late 1990s, it 
began to exceed the aggregate dividend yield. 
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dividends. In contrast, large firms, low leverage-ratio firms and mature firms are less 
relient on payout cuts to finance investments. The result is robust to changes in the 
definition of repurchase cuts.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief literature 
review on payouts and investments. Section 3 describes the data and variable construction. 
Section 4 proposes hypotheses. Section 5 discusses the regression results. We analyze 
how firms cut payouts when facing investment opportunities. More specifically, we 
explore the interactions between payout cut and firm size, leverage ratio, and age. We 
show how firms’ payout cut strategies change over time. Section 6 tests the robustness 
after we change the measurement of investment and repurchase cut. Section 7 draws 
conclusions and discusses future research directions. 
 
2.3. Literature Review 
The literature regarding payout policies answers why, how much, how, and when 
firms pay out. As to the first question, earlier researchers (for example, Jensen 1986) 
believe that shareholders pressure managers to pay out because of agency costs. If 
shareholders allow internal cash to over-accumulate, managers will have opportunities to 
invest in projects that benefit themselves, e.g., pet programs. Payouts prevent this from 
happening by reducing the accumulated cash level. Recent research has found more 
reasons for firms to pay out. For example, firms pay out to signal to the market that they 
have good earnings. Whited (2006) finds that payout is a signal of fewer financial 
constraints. According to Brav et al. (2005) and Gan and Wang (2012), firms pay out to 
obtain better access to external equity markets. 
23 
 
 
The consequent question is how much should firms pay out. On the one hand, 
smaller payouts mean greater cash cushion to absorb unexpected earning shocks. On the 
other hand, smaller payouts indicates greater agency cost and more negative signals to the 
market. Firms tradeoff between the benefits and costs, and choose the optimal payout 
level (DeAngelo et al., 2009).  
Another critical question is in what form (by dividends or by repurchases) firms pay 
out. In earlier years, firms were in favor of dividends, whereas nowadays firms prefer 
repurchases to dividends. The proportion of firms paying dividends was 66.5% in 1978, 
but dropped to 20.8% in 1999 (Fama and French, 2001). This change is partially due to 
the adoption of a series of rules and regulations. The first one is Rule 10b-18
2
, which was 
adopted in 1982. Before 1982, large-scale repurchases might have been deemed as 
manipulating stock prices. Rule 10b-18 provided firms with a safe harbor to repurchase, 
and made large-scale repurchases feasible for the first time (see figure 2.1). The 
aggregate repurchase yield increased by a factor greater than three in the five years 
following 1982.  
The second important rule change concerns the revision of the “prudent man rule” to 
the “prudent investor rule” in 1992. The prudent man rule requires trustees to invest as a  
prudent man  each investment is judged on its own merits. Under this rule, a stock that 
does not pay dividends is regarded as too risky to invest. Therefore, many firms pay 
dividends so that their stocks are not classified as “risky”. This situation changed when 
the “prudent investor rule” replaced the “prudent man rule” in 1992. Under the “prudent 
investor rule”, the risk is judged on the portfolio, not the individual investment. Therefore, 
                                                   
2
 See U.S. Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) website for more details: 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/r10b18faq0504.htm#P15_1144 
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since 1992, the distribution of dividends has not been as critical as before, and 
repurchases have become more important.  
The preference of repurchases over dividends is also due to some disadvantages of 
dividends. Dividends are much more rigid than repurchases. For firms paying dividends, 
the market expects them to pay continuously and maintain at least the same historical 
levels. If a firm reduces or omits the dividends, it receives a big market penalty. Denis 
and Osobov (2008) document that the stock price declines 6% on average over the three 
days after a firm announces a dividend cut. In contrast, the market does not expect firms 
to repurchase routinely. Firms can repurchase at any time and in any dollar amount. 
There is no significant market penalty for firms that reduce or omit repurchases.  
There are other benefits of repurchases. For example, repurchases are subject to 
lower tax rates than dividends. In addition, in the late 1990s many firms began to use 
stock options to compensate their employees. Therefore, these firms might increase 
repurchases to mitigate the dilutive effect of increased stock shares(Ben, Venky, and Skinner, 
2003). However, dividends are still an important form of payouts and are unlikely to 
disappear. Dividends convey a stronger signal to the market than repurchases. The 
stickiness of dividends implies that firms distributing dividends are much more confident 
in their future earnings than firms that repurchase. Therefore, some firms distribute 
dividends only, or payouts by means of dividends and repurchases at the same time.  
Lastly, another question concerns the timing of payouts. Usually, dividends are paid 
periodically, e.g., quarterly, whereas repurchases can occur anytime. When firms believe 
their stock is undervalued by the market, they may repurchase it to increase its price. Or,  
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when firms have high transitory cash flows, they may repurchase to prevent from over 
accumulating cash (DeAngelo et al., 2009). 
Even though the payout literature is rich, research on the relationship between 
payouts and investments has been limited. Some researchers focus on the relationship 
between investments and dividends, ignoring repurchases. Daniel et al. (2007) show that 
when firms fall short of money, only 6% cut dividends whereas 68% cut investment. 
Bulan et al. (2008) suggest that firms may strategically omit dividends to explore 
investment opportunities. Other researchers examine the relationship between 
investments and total payouts, but treat repurchases and dividends in the same way. 
Whited (2006) finds that small firms
3
 that distribute cash back capture more investment 
opportunities than small firms that do not, because cash to be paid out can provides 
internal financial resources for investment.  
Sarig (2004) examines the causal-effect relationship between total payouts and 
investments. Using a vector auto regression (VAR) model and aggregate-level data, he 
finds that corporate investment decisions lead to payout decisions, and not the other way 
around. However, dividends are sticky, whereas repurchases are much more flexible than 
dividends in both timing and dollar values. Because timing and dollar magnitudes are two 
important aspects of investment opportunities, one dollar of repurchases is not equivalent 
to one dollar of dividends in terms of potential internal financial resources for investment. 
Grouping both of them into a single aggregate payout may lead to biased conclusions.  
Brav et al. (2005) treat repurchases and dividends as different forms of payouts. They 
conduct a survey and find that most firms make dividend decisions before investment 
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 The sample in Whited (2006) distinguishes among “small firms”, “very small firms” and “small segments of 
conglomerates”. We ignore the difference and just name all of them “small firms”. 
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decisions, but make repurchase decisions after investment decisions. However, a surveys 
may be subject to wishful-thinking bias (Forsythea and Rietza, 1999). Firms may wish to 
make dividend decisions before investment decisions, but they may actually make 
dividend decisions after investment decisions or simultaneously. In addition, the 
conclusions of Whited (2006) and Sarig (2004) are not completely consistent with each 
other. One possible reason is that they use different data and methods. Sarig (2004) uses 
aggregate data. At the aggregate level, the result is more likely to be dominated by the 
behavior of large firms. In contrast, Whited (2006) examines only small firms and uses 
data at the firm-year level. 
Regarding measurments of investments, researchers use two methods. One method 
consist of using continuous investment data, whereas the other method focuses on 
discrete investments, i.e., investment spikes. Continuous measurement has some 
advantages: for example, it does not only provide more detailed information, but also 
helps address the cause-effect relationship between investments and payouts. To identify 
the cause-effect relationship, researchers typically use structural models and VAR models. 
For example, Gugler (2003) uses a structural model to analyze the relationships among 
dividends, R&D, and capital investment. Sarig (2004) estimates a VAR model to analyze 
the relationships among payouts, investments and earnings. All these models rely on 
continuous data.  
Other researchers suggest that investments are more likely to be lumpy rather than 
continuous. Doms and Dunne (1998) find that on average more than 25% of a plant’s 
accumulative investment over 17 years occurs within one year. They explain this 
phenomenon by non-convex adjustment costs. Furthermore, many modern corporate 
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finance theories are interested in investment spikes. For example, a theoretical model 
usually assumes that an entrepreneur has an indivisible investment opportunity, or project.  
This assumption is typical in financial textbooks. Discrete investment spikes incorporate 
this idea.  
Finally, observed payout cuts may have no cause-effect relationship with small 
investment fluctuations. It may well be the case that payout changes are induced by other 
factors. For example, a firm may cut repurchases because its stock is overvalued. At the 
same time, the firm uses a cash cushion to absorb the shocks of a small increase in 
investment. Therefore, a discrete method is plausible..  
 
2.4. Data and Variable Construction 
We use Compustat annual data from 1983 to 2011. Our data start in 1983 because 
large-scale repurchases became feasible only after Rule 10b-18 was passed in 1982. The 
variables we construct include firm characteristic variables, large investment variables, 
and payout cut variables. The details are as follows. 
Firm characteristic variables include cash, cash flow, sales growth, debt leverage 
ratio, market-to-book ratio (MB), size, investment ratio, dividend yield, repurchase yield, 
age, and age squared. Cash is cash (CH, item 162) divided by asset (AT, item6). Cash 
flow is income before extraordinary items (IB, item18) plus depreciation and 
amortization (DPC, item125), divided by asset. Sales growth equals sales (SALE, 
item117) in the current year minus sales in the last year, divided by last year’s sales. Debt 
leverage ratio is debt (LT+PSTKL-TXDITC-TXDITC-DCVT, item181+item10-item35 
-item79) divided by asset. MB equals market assets (AT-CEQ+CSHO*PRCC, 
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item6-item60+item25*item24) divided by asset. Size is logarithm of asset. Investment 
ratio is investment (CAPX, item145) divided by asset. Dividend yield equals dividends 
common/ordinary divided by asset (DVC/AT, item21/item6). Repurchase yield equals 
purchase of common and preferred stock (PRSTKC, item115) divided by asset. Age is 
the number of years that a firm has been listed on Compustat. For firms already listed in 
1983, we go back 12 years (back to 1971) to calculate the age.  
Utility firms and financial institutions (SIC 6000-6999, 4400-4999) are excluded 
from the sample because their operating is very different from other firms. To avoid 
results being seriously affected by a few outliers, we winsorize the data at the 0.5% level 
(not applicable to age). The final data set contains 493,741 firm-year observations. The 
descriptive statistics is shown in Panel A of table 2.1.  
We partition the payout activities into four categories: no payout, dividends only, 
repurchases only, and both dividends and repurchases, as shown in Panel B of table 2.1. 
Both Panel A and Panel B show that repurchases are at least as important as dividends. 
Panel A shows that the mean repurchase yield is 1.01%, 36% larger than the mean 
dividend yield (0.7%). Panel B shows that the numbers of firm-year repurchases and 
dividends are comparable: 15.9% of firm years pay out by repurchases only, 13.7% of 
firm years pay out by dividends only, and 11.2% of firm years pay out by both. More 
than half (59.2%) of firm years have no payout.  
To measure large investment activities, we use the discrete method for the reasons 
discussed before. We follow Whited (2006)’s definition of investment spike as follows: 
an investment spike occurs if investment ratio>2*median{the investment ratio of the 
firm}, and a dummy variable equals 1 if an investment spike occurs, and 0 other wise.  
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To describe payout cut activities, we define payout cut variables as follows. A 
dividend cut occurs when dividends in the current period are lower than dividends in the 
previous period. This definition is widely accepted by both academia and industry, 
because any cut in dividends leads to a significant market reaction. However, cut in 
repurchases has no clear definition. Repurchases are so flexible that a firm is not expected 
to repurchase as routinely as it is the case with distributing dividends. Therefore, it is 
assumed that only non-trivial reductions in repurchases are noticed by market. Following 
this idea, we define a repurchase cut as the repurchases at least 10% lower than in the 
previous year
4
, which is similar to the definition of Bliss, Cheng, and Denis 
(2013).Hereafter, repurchase cut means “non-trivial decrease in repurchase”.  
The cut of payouts have some preconditions. For example, for a firm to cut 
dividends, the precondition is that the firm must have distributed dividends in the 
previous year. We partition payout cuts into five categories: no payout cut, repurchase cut 
only, dividend cut only, combination of cutting both, and not applicable, each with its 
own preconditions. The details are as follows. 
Table of payout cut and preconditions 
Payout cut activities Preconditions 
1. No payout cut lagged .repo>0 or l.div>0 
2. Repurchases cut only lagged.repo>0 
3. Dividends cut only lagged.div>0 
4. Cut both lagged.div>0 & lagged.repo>0 
5. Not applicable lagged.div=0 & lagged.repo=0 
 
Table 2.2 describes unconditional payout cuts and payout cuts conditional on 
investment spikes. Unconditionally, firms are unwilling to cut dividends. Panel A shows 
that 37.9% of firm-year observations cut repurchases only, whereas 15.4% of firm-year 
observations cut dividends only, which is much smaller than the former. Conditionally on 
                                                   
4
 We try different criteria to define a non-trivial decrease in repurchases in the robustness test. 
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an investment spike, firms aggressively cut payout. The cut-both category increases from 
60.6% to 81.3%. It is consistent with our hypothesis that firms cut payouts to undertake 
large investments. Panel C shows the economic significance of cutting payouts. In dollar 
values, the median of the dividends cut to investment ratio is roughly 8%, and the median 
of repurchase cut to investment ratio is 11%. Both are substantial. When we look at the 
mean, both ratios are around 50%, which are even higher. 
  
2.5.  Hypothesis and the Models 
How does a firm optimize payout cuts to finance large investment in reality? In this 
section, we carry out a series of analyses to investigate this question by classifying 
payout-cut activities into different forms.  
First, we discuss how firms take advantage of the internal financial flexibility 
provided by repurchase cuts. Second, we investigate how firms’ payout cut strategies 
change under different external financial situations. There are at least four factors that 
may affect the external financing conditions: firm size, leverage ratio, age, and macro 
economic conditions. The first three are evaluated using cross sectional data, and the last 
one is examined using time series data. In the following, we discuss firms’ payout cut 
strategies case by case. 
2.5.1. Internal financing flexibility: repurchase cuts 
Repurchases are flexible in terms of timing and dollar value. This internal financial 
flexibility makes it easy for firms to cut repurchases. Therefore, our main hypothesis is: 
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H1: All firms are more likely to cut repurchases than cut nothing when there is an 
investment spike. Firms are not more likely to cut dividends only. 
Because both repurchase cuts and dividend cuts are discrete choices, we choose a 
discrete model to analyze firms’ preferences. The advocated multinominal model (Greene 
2012) is as follows: 
5
1
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( _ )
exp( _ )
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j it j it j it j
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 
   
   (1) 
 
where j=1,2,…,5. Payout_cut=1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 if cut nothing, cut repurchases only, cut 
dividends only, cuts both, or falls in a category of “not applicable” i. X is a vector of 
predetermined firm characteristic variables, including repurchase yield, dividend yield, 
market to book ratio, debt leverage ratio, log asset, cash, cash flow, sales growth, age, 
and age squared. All explanatory variables are one year lagged except for age and age 
squared. Y is a vector of variables that describes the partition of 1-year lagged payout 
categories: paid out nothing, repurchased only, distributed dividends only, or paid out by 
both methods in period t-1 for firm i. If a firm did not pay anything in the previous year, 
the discussion of cutting payout becomes trivial. Therefore, we introduce Y so that the 
discussion of payout cut activities is under comparable preconditions5. D is a vector of 
year dummy variables and industry dummy variables at the two-digit SIC code level. 
 
We mitigate the endogenous problem of investment by an instrumental variable method 
                                                   
5
 An alternative is to limit firms to a subsample that paid by both dividends and repurchases in the previous year, but 
this method leads to sample selection bias. Besides, this method drops too many observations, resulting in a loss of 
efficiency. Therefore, we prefer our precondition-control method. 
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(IV). We use a fixed-effect model to compute the expected investment, which is then 
used to estimated the investment spikes. An estimated investment spike occurs when the 
estimated investment is at least two times larger than the firm’s median. The model is as 
follow. 
*
1 2 1 3 1 4it it it i itinvestment investment X D v            
where X is the vector of firm characteristics defined as before, D* is a vector of year 
dummy variables, ω is a fixed effect, and v is the error term. 
 
 
2.5.2. Restricted external financing: firm size 
We further investigate how firms’ payout cut strategies change when external 
financing opportunities are restricted. Weinberg (1994) shows that it is harder for small 
firms to get external funding than for large firms, because the information asymmetry 
problem is more serious for them. Many other researchers support this point (for example, 
Beck etc., 2008; Martínez-Carrascal, 2010). As a result, cutting dividends and 
repurchases, or internal financing may be more important for small firms, but not for 
large firms. Following this idea, we form our sub-hypothesis A as follows. 
H1-A: To finance large investment, small firms are more likely to cut repurchases 
than to cut nothing. They are also more likely to cut both repurchases and dividends. 
Large firms rely less on payout cuts. 
To test this hypothesis, we examine the interaction between investment spikes and 
firm size. We partition the sample into three groups with the same number of 
observations by firm size in a year, namely, small, medium, and large firms. Then we 
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interact the size group with investment spikes. The multilominal model is as follows:                              
5
1
exp( . _ * _ . )
( _ )
exp( . _ * _ . )
j
j
j it it j it j it j
it
j it it j it j it j
k
i size grp investment spike X i Y D
prob payout cut j
i size grp investment spike X i Y D
    
    

   
 
   
   
(2) 
where size_grp=1, 2, or 3 if the size of a firm is small, medium or large.  
2.5.3. Restricted external financing: leverage ratio 
Similarly, it is more difficult for high-leverage firms to access external finance 
resources than for low-leverage firms. The mechanism is as follows. External finance 
includes debt and equity. When a high-leverage firm finances by debt, it further increases 
its leverage ratio, while the market regards a high leverage ratio as a signal to high default 
risk. Marchica and Mura (1994) suggest that firms with high leverage ratio have less 
borrowing power. When the firm finances by issuing equity, the market tends to response 
negatively to the stock price of a high-leverage firm (Cai et. al., 2010). Therefore, a firm 
with high leverage ratio has to rely more on internal finance, which increases the 
possibility of a payout cut. In addition, high leverage firms have less internal financial 
flexibility, because of the higher interest burden. To seek more financial flexibility, they 
might also rely more on payout cuts. Hence, we form our sub-hypothesis B as: 
H1-B: When there is an investment spike, high-leverage firms are more likely to cut 
repurchases than to cut nothing. They are also more likely to cut both repurchases and 
dividends. Low-leverage firms rely less on payout cuts. 
To test this hypothesis, We partition the sample into three groups with the same 
number of observations by firm leverage in a year, namely, low, medium, and high 
leverage firms. Then we interact the leverage ratio group with investment spikes. The 
model is as follows (see next papge): 
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i lev grp investment spike X i Y D
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    

   
 
   
   (3) 
where lev_grp=1, 2, or 3 if the leverage ratio of a firm is low, medium or high.  
2.5.4. Restricted external financing: age 
Firm age also affects the accessibility to external financial market. Gonzalez, Lopez, 
and Saurina (2007) argue that mature firms have established more track records so that 
the lenders can evaluate. Therefore, mature firms have less restriction in external 
financial market, and might rely less on payout cut to finance their investment spike. Our 
sub-hypothesis C is as follows: 
H1-C: When there is an investment spike, young firms are more likely to cut 
repurchases than cut nothing. They are also more likely to cut both repurchases and 
dividends. Mature firms are unwilling to cut payouts. Mature firms rely less on payout 
cuts. 
To test this hypothesis, We partition the sample into three groups with the same 
number of observations by firm age in a year, namely, young, medium, and mature firms. 
Then we interact the age group with investment spikes. The model is as follows.  
5
1
exp( . _ * _ . )
( _ )
exp( . _ * _ . )
j
j
j it it j it j it j
it
j it it j it j it j
k
i age grp investment spike X i Y D
prob payout cut j
i age grp investment spike X i Y D
    
    

   
 
   
    (4) 
where age_grp=1, 2, or 3 if the age of a firm is young, medium or matured.  
2.5.5. Restricted External financing: macro economic environment and the trend 
The macroeconomic and policy environments are continuously evolving. This 
change affects firms’ access to external financing sources. Therefore, firms’ payout 
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strategies change as well. We examine the trend of payout strategies when facing 
investment opportunities. We construct a year indicator variable and interact it with firm 
size and investment spikes. The model is as follows. 
5
1
exp[ .( _ * _ * ) . ]
( _ )
exp[ .( _ * _ * ) . ]
j
j
j it it j it j it j
it
j it it j it j it j
k
i investment spike size grp year X i Y D
prob payout cut j
i investment spike size grp year X i Y D
    
    

   
 
   
    
(5) 
where year=1983,…,2011, and the base category is cut nothing as before. To get more 
intuitive information, we use a descriptive statistical method instead of hypothesis test as 
follows. We extract the relative risk ratio (RRR) coefficients in the categories of 
repurchase cut only and dividend cut only, organizing by size. Then we plot the bar charts 
and analyze the trend and characteristics in some special years.  
 
2.6. Results 
The regression results of model 1 show how firms cut payouts at the aggregate level, 
with the cut-nothing category as the base category. We present the results without and 
with IV side by side in table 2.3. The not-applicable category is dropped because 
itY  
predicts it perfectly. The RRR shows the likelihood that firms choose this category over 
the base category. The results of the regressions with and without IV are quantitatively 
the same and consistent with our hypotheses. Firms are 9%-12% more likely to cut 
repurchases only than to cut nothing when there is an investment spike. They are not 
more likely to cut dividends or cut both dividends and repurchases only at any significant 
level. In other words, firms take advantage of internal financing flexibility by cutting 
repurchases to undertake large investment. In the rest of our analysis for sub groups, we 
only report the results from the IV method. 
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Model 2 frames how payout cuts interact with firm size. The regression results (table 
2.4) are very striking. When there is an investment spike, small firms are 17% more 
likely to cut repurchases only at a 1% significance level, and 39% more likely to cut both 
dividends and repurchases. They do not cut dividends alone. It shows a payout cut 
hierarchy for small firms. They may cut repurchases only, or cut both, but do not cut 
dividends without cutting repurchases. However, large firms show a different preference 
order. They are indifferent between cutting repurchases only and cutting nothing, and are 
13% less likely to cut dividends only at a 5% significance level. It shows that small firms 
rely greatly on payout cuts to finance large investment, while large firms do not rely on 
payout cuts to finance large investment.  
Model 3 depicts how firms’ payout cuts interact with the leverage ratio. The 
regression results are shown in table 2.5. High leverage firms choose a more aggressive 
payout cut strategy. They are 44% more likely to cut both dividends and repurchases than 
to cut nothing at a 1% significance level. Similar to small firms, they are not more likely 
to cut dividends only and show a payout cut hierarchy. In contrast, low leverage firms are 
indifferent between these cutting methods. Their RRR coefficients of the three cut 
strategies are neither economically significant (0.97~1.07, close to 1) nor statistically 
significant. Succinctly, high leverage firms rely more on payout cuts to finance their large 
investments.  
Model 4 explores the interaction between age and payout cut (table 2.6) when an 
investment spike occurs. Young firms are 21% more likely to cut repurchases only, and 
34% more likely to cut both repurchases and dividends. In contrast, mature firms are only 
9% more likely to cut repurchases. But they are not more likely to cut dividends only or 
37 
 
 
cut both at any significant level. Therefore, young firms rely more on payout cut than 
mature firms.  
We use model 5 to analyze payout cuts in some special years and the trend. The 
results are depicted in figures 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4. Figure 2.2 shows that small firms rely on 
payout cuts in most of the years: the majority columns are above 1. As to the preference 
between dividend cut and repurchase cut, small firms prefer the former before 1995, but 
the preference is reversed after 1995. Obviously, the cost of cutting dividends for small 
firms become higher than before, but the reason is unclear. This question is beyond the 
scope of our paper, and it is left for future research.  
Large firms are less likely to cut dividends than to cut nothing over most years. 
Sometimes they may cut repurchases to finance large investment: in 14 out of 28 years, 
they prefer cut repurchases to cut nothing. This phenomenon is consistent with our 
conclusion in the previous discussion: repurchases are more flexible than dividends.  
We notice that around 2007, all firms (small, medium and large) cut payouts, 
regardless of repurchases and dividends, to finance large investments. This phenomenon 
coincides with the starting of sub-prime crisis. Meanwhile, it is extremely difficult for all 
the firms to get external finance. Therefore, all the firms, regardless of their size, have to 
rely more on internal finance-cut repurchases and dividends. These findings are 
consistent with Bliss, Chen, and Denis (2013), and support the part of conclusion in the 
survey of Brav et al. (2005): in “extreme circumstances”, firms may cut dividends to 
undertake investment (See table 11 of Brav et. al. 2005). Of course, the market condition 
in 2007 can be viewed as “extreme”.  
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To sum up, we find that repurchase cuts provide internal financial flexibility. Firms 
are more likely to cut repurchases than to cut nothing to undertake large investments. 
Accessibility to external finance also plays a key role in the determination of payout cuts. 
If firms have difficulty accessing external financial resources, they will cut any payout, 
even dividends, to finance investment. But they will cut repurchases first, and dividends 
later. 
 
2.7. Robustness Tests 
In this section, we change the criteria of investment spikes and repurchase cuts. We 
find our results are robust. 
In our previous analysis, an investment spike is defined as the investment at least 2 
times larger than the firm median. We change the criteria from 2X to 1.5X, 2.5X, and 3X 
larger than the firm medium (1.5X, 2X, 2.5X, and 3X criteria). We also apply two 
different criteria
6
 to repurchase cuts: (1) at least 20% lower than the previous year (20% 
criteria), and (2) at least 20% lower than the moving average of the previous three years 
(MA criteria). The precondition variable itY , which describes the lagged payout categories, 
is changed accordingly.  
Firstly, we perform a robustness test at the aggregate level. Due to length limitations 
we only report the results after we change the criteria for investment spikes. Results are 
shown in table 2.3. Firms are 8%-12% more likely to cut repurchase only, but they are 
not more likely to cut dividends only at any significant level. An interesting phenomenon 
                                                   
6
 A better method is to examine the difference between announced repurchases and realized repurchases, but we do 
not have the data. The definition of investment spike is less controversial, because this criteria is used by some 
researchers (Whited 2006) 
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is that, after the criteria of investment spike are increased from 2X to 2.5X or 3X, firms 
are 26%-29% more likely to cut both dividends and repurchases (vs. insignificant under 
2X criterion). The reason is that larger investment spikes require for more cash. Therefore, 
firms have to rely on more aggressive payout cuts. 
We also run equation 2, 3, and 4 after changing the criteria for investment spikes and 
repurchase cuts
7
. We present the new results on the right side of the original regression 
results to make comparison more convenient. The results are still robust and consistent 
with our sub-hypothesis H1-A, H1-B, and H1-C (see tables 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6). For 
example (see table 2.4), small firms are significantly more likely to cut repurchase only 
under 10%, 20%, and MA criteria of repurchase cut. They are also more likely to do so 
under 2X and 2.5X criteria of investment spikes. Again, when we increase the threshold 
of investment spikes to 3X, we find that small firms rely more on aggressive payout cuts. 
They are 62% more likely to cut both, (vs. 39% under the 2X criteria of investment spike). 
At the same time, the RRR’s of small firms in the repurchase cut only category is not 
statistically significant anymore. It shows that after increasing the criterion of investment 
spikes from 2X to 3X, repurchase cuts alone does not meet their demands for cash. In 
contrast, large firms do not rely too much on payout cuts. In the repurchase cut only 
category, none of the RRR’s is significant. In the cut both category, 4 out of 5 results are 
not significant.  
The situation is similar when we partition the firms by leverage ratio and age (table 
2.5 and table 2.6). Firms with restrictions to external financial recourses, i.e., high 
leverage-ratio firms and young firms rely more on payout cut. For example, under the 
                                                   
7
 The results under 1.5X criteria are less prominent due to less cash shortage. We report them in the appendix A, 
table 1. 
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10%, 20% and MA criteria of repurchase cut, high leverage-ratio firms are 13%-24% 
more likely to cut repurchases (table 2.5), and young firms are 13%-21% more likely to 
cut repurchases (table 2.6). Under the 2.5X and 3X criteria for investment spikes, high 
leverage-ratio firms are 58%-60% more likely to cut both repurchases and dividends, and 
young firms are 59%-70% more likely to cut both repurchases and dividends. These 
results are both economically and statistically significant. 
In our previous regressions, we use dummy variables to control the preconditions of 
payout cuts and regress on the pooled data. When firms that do not meet the precondition 
for payout cuts, the regressions result in probabilities that are numerically close to but not 
exactly zeros. To avoid this problem, we run logit regression on three subset of the data 
set seperately: (1) lagged repurchases>0 ; (2) lagged dividends>0; (3) lagged 
repurchases>0 & lagged dividends>0. The corresponding dependent variables are 
indicator variables of: (1) cut repurchases only; (2) cut dividends only; (3) cut both. The 
results are presented in tables 2.7, 2.8, and 2.9 (pairwise regression). For convenience, we 
stack the pairwise logit regression result to mimic the format of pooled multilogit 
regressons. We find that the results of both methods are quite similar. We have 3x3x3=27 
( 3 payout cut methods X 3 partition X 3 firm characteristics) relevant variables. 25 out of 
27 coefficients are almost the same. For example, the coefficients corresponding to 
“repurchase cut only” for small, medium, and large firms are 1.17***, 1.13***, and 1.06 
in the pooled regression vs. 1.14**, 1.12**, and 1.07 in the pairwise regression. Only two 
have some changes, but are still in the same direction: the coefficient of “cut both” for 
small firms is changed from 1.39** to 1.04, and the coefficient of cut both for high 
leverage ratio is changed from 1.44*** to 1.13, where * denotes significance level. 
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To sum up, the results in section 3 are robust after we change the criteria for 
investment spike and repurchase cut. Facing investment opportunities, firms with 
restrictions to access external financial sources rely more on internal funds. They cut 
payouts more aggressively, and exhibit a payout cut hierarchy. We also investigate 1.5X, 
4X, and 5X criteria for investment spikes, finding similar results (the results under 1.5X 
criteria are reported in table 2.10, and the rest are unreported due to length limitations). 
 
2.8. Conclusion 
This paper examines the relationships between payout policies and investments. 
Dividends are sticky, because cutting dividends generally results in negative market 
responses. In contrast, repurchases are more flexible in terms of timing and dollar values. 
Therefore, firms are more likely to cut repurchases to undertake large investments. Firms 
that have difficulties accessing external financial markets rely more on internal finance. 
To undertake large investments, they have to aggressively cut payouts. For example, 
small firms, high leverage-ratio firms, and young firms are more likely to cut payouts 
when facing investment opportunities. Their payout cut behaviors also show a hierarchy, 
or a preference order. Usually, they prefer to cut repurchases rather than dividends. In 
contrast, large firms, low leverage firms, and mature firms do not rely too much on 
payout cuts to finance large investments. Our results are robust to changes in the 
measurement of repurchase cuts and investment spikes. In extreme circumstances, such 
as in the financial crisis of late 2000s, all firms rely more on internal finance when facing 
investment opportunities. They cut payouts aggressively to undertake large investments, 
regardless of dividends or repurchases.  
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Our research has some limitations. We do not address cause-effect relationships 
between payout cuts and investments. Previous researchers addressed this problem by 
employing a VAR model at the aggregate level, but did not differentiate between payout 
forms (see Sarig 2004). We follow their method, but differentiating between payout 
methods, and the results are inconsistent (unreported). A possible reason is that the 
preference order of firms’ payout cuts is affected by firms’ characteristics, whereas VAR 
models typically uses aggregate data, which assumes all firms have the same preference 
order. Furthermore, to identify cause-effect relationships, VAR models rely on Granger 
test. The logic is that, if X causes Y, then X in t-1 period affects Y in t period, and Y in 
t-1 period does not affect X in t. However, this argument is not applicable in our 
research
8
. Therefore, our paper does not use the VAR method. The causal-effect relation 
is reserved for future research. 
Finally, our research fills a gap in the literature. We are the first to quantitatively 
examine the relationship between investments and payouts policies. Unlike previous 
researchers, we carefully differentiate between payout methods. Our findings help to 
explain the controversy between the pecking order theory and the trade off theory in 
corporate finance (Byoun, 2007). We show that firms with more difficulties to access 
external financial resources are more likely to cut payout, regardless of repurchases or 
dividends. Because payout cuts are potential sources of internal finance, their behaviors 
more consistent with the pecking order theory instead of the tradeoff theory. 
                                                   
8
 Consider the following ad-hoc example. Firms make dividend decisions first, investment decisions second, and 
repurchase decisions last. This is consistent with the basic framework: dividends are rigid, and repurchases are flexible. 
Then, dividends cause investment, and investments cause repurchases. By a  Granger test argument, a repurchase 
cut in t-1 should lead to an investment change in t. However, this is not the case. A repurchase cut in t-1 is due to a 
large investment in t-1, and has nothing to do with investment in t.  
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Appendix 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Aggregate Repurchase & Dividend Yield Trend: 1971-2011 
Aggregate repurchase yield equals aggregate repurchase divided by aggregate asset. 
Aggregate repurchase yield equals aggregate dividend divided by aggregate asset. 
The data comes from compustat 
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Figure 2.2 The trend for small firms 
 
 
Figure 2.3 The trend for medium firms 
 
 
Figure 2.4 The trend for large firms 
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Table 2.1 Descriptive statistics 
Panel A Firm characteristics    
Variable Obs  Mean Std.Dev. Min Median Max 
repo_yield 173049 0.0101  0.0354  0 0 0.2880  
dv_yield 173049 0.0074  0.0236  0 0 0.2066  
investment_ratio 173049 0.0641  0.0827  0 0.038 0.5704  
Asset (million $) 173049 1264.33  4831  0.037 70.45 42419  
book_leverage_ratio 173049 0.8282  2.21  0 0.47 23.44  
Cashflow (million $) 173049 110.33  483.19  -217.20  0.06 4426.94 
Cash (million $) 173049 0.14 0.19 0 0.06 0.97 
market_to_book 173049 3.0534  10.10  0.002 1.30 113.81  
sale_growth 173049 0.3088  1.48  -1 0.058 15.79  
age (year) 173049 18.63  10.91  0 9.3 41 
       
Panel B Payout activities     
Payout activities Obs  % of total obs    
0. No payout 102502 59.2%     
1. Repurchases only 27435 15.9%     
2. Dividends only 23716 13.7%     
3. Both 19396 11.2%     
Total 173049 100.0%     
       
Panel C Investment activities    
Investment activities Obs % of total obs Mean. inv. ratio  
Inv. spikes (2X of the median) 25962 15.0% 0.1391  
Investment (non spikes, non zero) 137045 79.0% 0.0548  
Investment (non spikes, zeros) 10042 6% 0  
Total 173049 100.0% 0.0641  
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Table 2.2 Payout cuts and investment spikes  
Panel A Payout cut    
Payout cut Obs Precondition Base obs % of base obs  
0. No div cut and repo decrease 28928 l.repo>0 or l.div>0 82571 35.0%  
1. Non-trivial repo decrease only 22909 l.repo>0 60474 37.9%  
2. Dividends cut only 8940 l.div>0 58086 15.4%  
3. Cut both 21794 l.div>0&l.repo>0 35989 60.6%  
4. Not appliable 90478 l.div=0 & l.repo=0 - -  
Total 173049          
       
Panel B Payout cut when there is an investment spike  
Payout cut Obs Precondition 1 Precondition 2 Base obs % of base obs Dif 
0. No div cut and repo decrease 2729 l.repo>0 or l.div>0 inv_spk=1 10826 25.2% -9.8% 
1. Non-trivial repo decrease only 2764 l.repo>0 inv_spk=1 8553 32.3% -5.6% 
2. Dividends cut only 931 l.div>0 inv_spk=1 7686 12.1% -3.3% 
3. Cut both 4402 l.div>0&l.repo>0 inv_spk=1 5413 81.3% 20.8% 
4. Not appliable 15136 l.div=0 & l.repo=0 inv_spk=1 15136 - - 
Total 25962           
       
Panel C (winsorized at 10%) Economic significance of cut     
  median mean     
Div cut to inv. ratio 7.85% 50.54%     
Non-trivial repo. cut to inv. ratio 11.43% 57.41%     
year range: 1983-2011       
 
4
8
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Table 2.3  Aggregate regression 
The regression model is: 
5
1
exp( _ . )
( _ )
exp( _ . )
j
j
j it j it j it j
it
j it j it j it j
k
investment spike X i Y D
prob payout cut j
investment spike X i Y D
    
    

   
 
   
         (1)              
j=1,2,…,5. _ itpayout cut =1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 if firm i cuts nothing, cuts repurchases only, cut dividends only, 
cuts both, or falls in a category of “not applicable”.
itX  is a vector of predetermined firm characteristic 
variables, including repurchase yield, dividend yield, market to book ratio, debt leverage ratio, log asset, 
cash flow, cash, sales growth, age, and age squared. All 'itX s  are one year lagged except for age and 
age squared. 
itY  is a variable that describes the partition of 1-year lagged payout categories. itY =1, 2, 3, 
or 4 if firm i paid out nothing, repurchased only, distributed dividends only, or paid out by both methods in 
period t-1.  i. is an indicator operation. D is a vector of year dummy variables and industry dummy 
variables at two-digit SIC code level. Except for column 1, the investment spike is instrumented. We use a 
following fixed effect model to estimate investment at t:  
 
*
1 2 1 3 1 4it it it i itinvestment investment X D v            
Then we define an investment spike when the estimated investment is at least 2X, 2.5X or 3X larger than 
the firm median. 
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Table  2.3 Aggregate regression 
  Model 1 
 w/o IV              IV             Variation of inv. spike 
Criteria of inv_spk 2X   2X 2.5X 3X 
Criteria of repo cut 10% 10% 10% 10% 
Cut methods RRR 
No cut   (base outcome)  
Repo cut only     
    inv_spk_2x 1.09**    
    E(inv_spk_2x)  1.12***   
    E(inv_spk_2.5x)   1.10***  
    E(inv_spk_3x)    1.08* 
    l.market_to_book 0.95*** 0.95*** 0.95*** 0.95*** 
    l.log_at 0.88*** 0.88*** 0.88*** 0.88*** 
    l.cash 0.54*** 0.51*** 0.52*** 0.53*** 
    l.cashflow 0.40*** 0.41*** 0.41*** 0.41*** 
    l.sale_growth 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 
    l.book_leverage_ratio 1.15*** 1.15*** 1.14*** 1.14*** 
    l.repo_yield 1.63e+4*** 1.64e+4*** 1.64e+4*** 1.63e+4*** 
    l.div_yield 0.28 0.27* 0.27* 0.27* 
    age 0.95*** 0.95*** 0.95*** 0.95*** 
    age2 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 
Div cut only         
    inv_spk_2x 1.00     
    E(inv_spk_2x)  0.99   
    E(inv_spk_25x)   1.03  
    E(inv_spk_3x)    1.09 
    l.market_to_book 0.92*** 0.92*** 0.92*** 0.92*** 
    l.log_at 0.88*** 0.88*** 0.88*** 0.88*** 
    l.cash 2.25*** 2.26*** 2.22*** 2.20*** 
    l.cashflow 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
    l.sale_growth 0.93** 0.93** 0.93** 0.93*** 
    l.book_leverage_ratio 1.59*** 1.59*** 1.59*** 1.59*** 
    l.repo_yield 125.14*** 125.96*** 125.15*** 124.97*** 
    l.div_yield 3.85e+6*** 3.88e+6*** 3.77e+06*** 3.65e+6*** 
    age 0.93*** 0.93*** 0.93*** 0.93*** 
    age2 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 
Cut both         
    inv_spk_2x 1.14    
    E(inv_spk_2x)  1.11   
    E(inv_spk_25x)   1.26***  
    E(inv_spk_3x)    1.29** 
    l.market_to_book 0.67*** 0.67*** 0.67*** 0.67*** 
    l.log_at 0.78*** 0.78*** 0.78*** 0.78*** 
    l.cash 0.39*** 0.38*** 0.36*** 0.37*** 
    l.cashflow 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
    l.sale_growth 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 
    l.book_leverage_ratio 2.31*** 2.31*** 2.31*** 2.31*** 
    l.repo_yield 1.55e+08*** 1.55e+08*** 1.55e+08*** 1.56e+08*** 
    l.div_yield 4.53e+7*** 4.35e+7*** 4.09e+07*** 4.08e+7*** 
    age 0.93*** 0.94*** 0.94*** 0.94*** 
    age2 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 
N 145482 145482 145482 145482 
Pseudo R2 0.7425 0.7425 0.7425 0.7425 
legend * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
H0: the corresponding coefficient=1 
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Table 2.4  Interaction with size 
We equally partition firms into small, median and large groups by size in a year. Then we interact the size 
group with investment spikes. The model is as follows.  
5
1
exp( . _ * _ . )
( _ )
exp( . _ * _ . )
j
j
j it it j it j it j
it
j it it j it j it j
k
i size grp investment spike X i Y D
prob payout cut j
i size grp investment spike X i Y D
    
    

   
 
   
      
(2) 
j=1,2,…,5. _size grp =1, 2, or 3 if the firm size is small, medium or large. _ itpayout cut =1, 2, 3, 4 or 
5 if firm i cuts nothing, cuts repurchases only, cut dividends only, cuts both, or falls in a category of “not 
applicable”.
itX  is a vector of predetermined firm characteristic variables, including repurchase yield, 
dividend yield, market to book ratio, debt leverage ratio, log asset, cash flow, cash, sales growth, age, and 
age squared. All 'itX s are one year lagged except for age and age squared. itY  is a variable that 
describes the partition of 1-year lagged payout categories. 
itY =1, 2, 3, or 4 if firm i paid out nothing, 
repurchased only, distributed dividends only, or paid out by both methods in period t-1.  i. is an indicator 
operation. D is a vector of year dummy variables and industry dummy variables at two-digit SIC code level. 
The investment spike is instrumented. We use a following fixed effect model to estimate investment at t: 
 
*
1 2 1 3 1 4it it it i itinvestment investment X D v            
Then we define an investment spike when the estimated investment is at least 2X, 2.5X or 3X larger than 
the firm median. 
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Table 2.4  Interaction with size 
  Model 2 
 Original model      Variation of repo cut          Variation of inv. spike 
Criteria of inv_spk 2X 2X 2X 2.5X 3X 
Criteria of repo cut 10% 20% ma 10% 10% 
Cut methods   RRR   
No cut   (base outcome) 
Repo cut only           
    i.E(inv_spk)*size      
        small 1.17*** 1.14** 1.15*** 1.09 1.04 
        medium 1.13*** 1.12*** 1.03 1.12** 1.09 
        large 1.06 1.05 1.08* 1.09 1.1 
    l.market_to_book 0.95*** 0.96*** 0.98*** 0.95*** 0.95*** 
    l.log_at 0.88*** 0.87*** 0.86*** 0.88*** 0.87*** 
    l.cash 0.51*** 0.52*** 0.49*** 0.52*** 0.53*** 
    l.cashflow 0.41*** 0.42*** 0.36*** 0.40*** 0.41*** 
    l.sale_growth 1.01 1.02 1 1.01 1.01 
    l.book_leverage_ratio 1.15*** 1.14*** 1.28*** 1.16*** 1.14*** 
    l.repo_yield 1.63e+4*** 0.51e+4*** 0.37*** 1.57e+4*** 1.63e+4*** 
    l.div_yield 0.26* 0.27* 2.28 0.35 0.27* 
    age 0.95*** 0.95*** 0.97*** 0.95*** 0.95*** 
    age2 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 
Div cut only      
    i.E(inv_spk)*size      
        small 1.06 1.06 1.05 1.02 1.07 
        medium 1.14** 1.13* 1.15** 1.22*** 1.33*** 
        large 0.87** 0.87** 0.89* 0.89 0.92 
    l.market_to_book 0.92*** 0.92*** 0.91*** 0.92*** 0.92*** 
    l.log_at 0.88*** 0.88*** 0.89*** 0.88*** 0.88*** 
    l.cash 2.21*** 2.23*** 1.94*** 2.11*** 2.19*** 
    l.cashflow 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
    l.sale_growth 0.93** 0.93** 0.94** 0.93** 0.93*** 
    l.book_leverage_ratio 1.59*** 1.59*** 1.35*** 1.54*** 1.59*** 
    l.repo_yield 123.58*** 145.39*** 166.46*** 109.51*** 120.71*** 
    l.div_yield 3.66e+06*** 3.59e+06*** 1.34e+06*** 3.35e+06*** 3.47e+06*** 
    age 0.93*** 0.93*** 0.93*** 0.93*** 0.93*** 
    age2 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 
Cut both           
    i.E(inv_spk)*size      
        small 1.39** 1.35* 1.42*** 1.52** 1.62** 
        medium 1.16 1.18 1.13 1.26* 1.26 
        large 0.99 0.99 1 1.24* 1.17 
    l.market_to_book 0.67*** 0.68*** 0.71*** 0.67*** 0.67*** 
    l.log_at 0.79*** 0.78*** 0.78*** 0.79*** 0.78*** 
    l.cash 0.36*** 0.35*** 0.46*** 0.32*** 0.36*** 
    l.cashflow 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
    l.sale_growth 0.98 0.99 0.94 0.96 0.98 
    l.book_leverage_ratio 2.32*** 2.31*** 2.34*** 2.07*** 2.32*** 
    l.repo_yield 1.54e+8*** 4.63e+7*** 6965.17*** 7.14e+07*** 1.56e+8*** 
    l.div_yield 4.01e+7*** 5.57e+7*** 2.98e+7*** 1.37e+07*** 3.98e+7*** 
    age 0.93*** 0.93*** 0.93*** 0.93*** 0.94*** 
    age2 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 
N 145482 145482 145482 145482 145482 
Pseudo R2 0.7426 0.7397 0.7046 0.7425 0.7425 
legend * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01   
H0: the corresponding coefficient=1 
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Table 2.5  Interaction with leverage 
We equally partition firm into low, median and high groups by leverage ratio in a year. Then we interact 
the leverage ratio group with investment spikes. The model is as follows.  
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j
j
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it
j it it j it j it j
k
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 
   
     (3) 
where lev_grp=1, 2, or 3 if the leverage ratio of a firm is low, medium or high. j=1,2,…,5. 
_ itpayout cut =1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 if firm i cuts nothing, cuts repurchases only, cut dividends only, cuts both, 
or falls in a category of “not applicable”.
itX  is a vector of predetermined firm characteristic variables, 
including repurchase yield, dividend yield, market to book ratio, debt leverage ratio, log asset, cash flow,  
cash, sales growth, age, and age squared. All 'itX s  are one year lagged except for age and age squared. 
itY  is a variable that describes the partition of 1-year lagged payout categories. itY =1, 2, 3, or 4 if firm i 
paid out nothing, repurchased only, distributed dividends only, or paid out by both methods in period t-1.  
i. is an indicator operation. D is a vector of year dummy variables and industry dummy variables at 
two-digit SIC code level. The investment spike is instrumented. We use a following fixed effect model to 
estimate investment at t: 
 
*
1 2 1 3 1 4it it it i itinvestment investment X D v            
 
Then we define an investment spike when the estimated investment is at least 2X, 2.5X or 3X larger than 
the firm median. 
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Table 2.5  Interaction with leverage 
  Model 3 
 Original model         Variation of repo cut          Variation of inv. spike 
Criteria of inv_spk 2X 2X 2X 2.5X 3X 
Criteria of repo cut 10% 20% ma 10% 10% 
Cut methods   RRR   
No cut   (base outcome) 
Repo cut only           
    i.E(inv_spk)*leverage      
        low 1.05 1.02 1 1.08 1.04 
        medium 1.19*** 1.21*** 1.08** 1.15** 1.17** 
        high 1.10* 1.11* 1.19*** 1.09 1.03 
    l.market_to_book 0.95*** 0.96*** 0.98*** 0.95*** 0.95*** 
    l.log_at 0.88*** 0.87*** 0.86*** 0.88*** 0.88*** 
    l.cash 0.52*** 0.54*** 0.50*** 0.52*** 0.53*** 
    l.cashflow 0.38*** 0.41*** 0.35*** 0.41*** 0.41*** 
    l.sale_growth 1.01 1.02 1 1.01 1.01 
    l.book_leverage_ratio 1.15*** 1.13*** 1.24*** 1.14*** 1.15*** 
    l.repo_yield 1.68e+4*** 0.51e+4*** 0.37*** 1.64e+4*** 1.62e+4*** 
    l.div_yield 0.38 0.28 2.3 0.28* 0.28 
    age 0.95*** 0.95*** 0.97*** 0.95*** 0.95*** 
    age2 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 
Div cut only      
    i.E(inv_spk)*leverage      
        low 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.98 1.03 
        medium 0.96 0.94 0.92 1.09 1.19** 
        high 1.08 1.06 1.18** 1.04 1.06 
    l.market_to_book 0.92*** 0.91*** 0.91*** 0.92*** 0.92*** 
    l.log_at 0.88*** 0.88*** 0.88*** 0.88*** 0.88*** 
    l.cash 2.18*** 2.30*** 2.03*** 2.25*** 2.21*** 
    l.cashflow 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
    l.sale_growth 0.93*** 0.93*** 0.94** 0.93** 0.93*** 
    l.book_leverage_ratio 1.52*** 1.57*** 1.31*** 1.58*** 1.58*** 
    l.repo_yield 102.94*** 145.77*** 164.61*** 125.15*** 123.59*** 
    l.div_yield 2.68e+6*** 3.79e+6*** 1.47e+6*** 3.82e+06*** 3.63e+6*** 
    age 0.93*** 0.93*** 0.93*** 0.93*** 0.93*** 
    age2 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 
Cut both           
    i.E(inv_spk)*leverage      
        low 1.07 1.07 1.01 1.17 1.24 
        medium 1.02 1.05 1.06 1.11 1.12 
        high 1.44*** 1.28** 1.32*** 1.60*** 1.58*** 
    l.market_to_book 0.65*** 0.68*** 0.71*** 0.67*** 0.67*** 
    l.log_at 0.79*** 0.78*** 0.77*** 0.78*** 0.78*** 
    l.cash 0.33*** 0.37*** 0.48*** 0.38*** 0.38*** 
    l.cashflow 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
    l.sale_growth 0.96 0.99 0.94 0.97 0.97 
    l.book_leverage_ratio 1.83*** 2.24*** 2.16*** 2.22*** 2.26*** 
    l.repo_yield 7.07e+7*** 4.58e+7*** 7228.62*** 1.53e+08*** 1.49e+8*** 
    l.div_yield 1.24e+7*** 5.93e+7*** 3.54e+7*** 4.15e+07*** 3.88e+7*** 
    age 0.94*** 0.93*** 0.94*** 0.94*** 0.94*** 
    age2 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 
N 145482 145482 145482 145482 145482 
Pseudo R2 0.7424 0.7397 0.7046 0.7425 0.7425 
legend * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01   
H0: the corresponding coefficient=1 
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Table 2.6  Interaction with age 
We equally partition firm into low, median and high groups by leverage ratio in a year. Then we interact 
the leverage ratio group with investment spikes. The model is as follows.  
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     (4) 
where age_grp=1, 2, or 3 if the age of a firm is young, medium or matured. j=1,2,…,5. _ itpayout cut =1, 
2, 3, 4 or 5 if firm i cuts nothing, cuts repurchases only, cut dividends only, cuts both, or falls in a category 
of “not applicable”.
itX  is a vector of predetermined firm characteristic variables, including repurchase 
yield, dividend yield, market to book ratio, debt leverage ratio, log asset, cash flow, cash, sales growth, age, 
and age squared. All 'itX s  are one year lagged except for age and age squared. itY  is a variable that 
describes the partition of 1-year lagged payout categories. 
itY =1, 2, 3, or 4 if firm i paid out nothing, 
repurchased only, distributed dividends only, or paid out by both methods in period t-1.  i. is an indicator 
operation. D is a vector of year dummy variables and industry dummy variables at two-digit SIC code level. 
The investment spike is instrumented. We use a following fixed effect model to estimate investment at t: 
 
*
1 2 1 3 1 4it it it i itinvestment investment X D v            
 
Then we define an investment spike when the estimated investment is at least 2X, 2.5X or 3X larger than 
the firm median. 
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Table 2.6  Interaction with age 
  Model 4 
 Original model       Variation of repo cut         Variation of inv. Spike    
Criteria of inv_spk 2X 2X 2X 2.5X 3X 
Criteria of repo cut 10% 20% ma 10% 10% 
Cut methods   RRR   
No cut   (base outcome) 
Repo cut only           
    i.E(inv_spk)*age      
        young 1.21*** 1.20*** 1.08* 1.20*** 1.18** 
        medium 1.06 1.06 1.03 1.07 1.07 
        mature 1.09* 1.07 1.08* 1.06 0.97 
    l.market_to_book 0.95*** 0.96*** 0.98*** 0.95*** 0.95*** 
    l.log_at 0.88*** 0.87*** 0.86*** 0.88*** 0.87*** 
    l.cash 0.51*** 0.52*** 0.48*** 0.52*** 0.53*** 
    l.cashflow 0.41*** 0.42*** 0.29*** 0.41*** 0.41*** 
    l.sale_growth 1.01 1.02 1 1.01 1.01 
    l.book_leverage_ratio 1.14*** 1.14*** 1.31*** 1.14*** 1.14*** 
    l.repo_yield 1.65e+4*** 0.51e+4*** 0.41*** 1.64e+4*** 1.62e+4*** 
    l.div_yield 0.27* 0.28 3.11* 0.27* 0.27* 
    age 0.95*** 0.95*** 0.97*** 0.95*** 0.95*** 
    age2 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 
Div cut only      
  i.E(inv_spk)*age      
        young 1.13* 1.13* 1.21*** 1.15* 1.27*** 
        medium 0.95 0.95 1.01 1 1.08 
        mature 0.9 0.89* 0.96 0.94 0.9 
    l.market_to_book 0.92*** 0.91*** 0.89*** 0.92*** 0.92*** 
    l.log_at 0.88*** 0.88*** 0.89*** 0.88*** 0.88*** 
    l.cash 2.29*** 2.31*** 1.73*** 2.25*** 2.25*** 
    l.cashflow 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.01*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
    l.sale_growth 0.93*** 0.93*** 0.93** 0.93*** 0.93*** 
    l.book_leverage_ratio 1.58*** 1.58*** 1.30*** 1.58*** 1.58*** 
    l.repo_yield 125.79*** 147.02*** 62.51*** 124.03*** 122.65*** 
    l.div_yield 3.79e+6*** 3.71e+6*** 1.48e+5*** 3.74e+6*** 3.63e+6*** 
    age 0.94*** 0.94*** 0.94*** 0.94*** 0.94*** 
    age2 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 
Cut both           
  i.E(inv_spk)*age      
        young 1.34** 1.32** 1.21* 1.59*** 1.70*** 
        medium 1.03 1.04 1.20* 1.16 1.24 
        mature 1.06 1.06 1.14 1.17 1.08 
    l.market_to_book 0.67*** 0.68*** 0.64*** 0.67*** 0.67*** 
    l.log_at 0.78*** 0.78*** 0.79*** 0.78*** 0.78*** 
    l.cash 0.38*** 0.36*** 0.38*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 
    l.cashflow 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.01*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
    l.sale_growth 0.98 0.99 0.90** 0.98 0.98 
    l.book_leverage_ratio 2.30*** 2.29*** 1.94*** 2.30*** 2.31*** 
    l.repo_yield 1.55e+8*** 4.63e+7*** 2048.42*** 1.54e+08*** 1.53e+8*** 
    l.div_yield 4.17e+7*** 5.75e+7*** 2.32e+6*** 3.94e+07*** 3.96e+7*** 
    age 0.94*** 0.94*** 0.94*** 0.94*** 0.94*** 
    age2 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 
N 145482 145482 145482 145482 145482 
Pseudo R2 0.7426 0.7397 0.7029 0.7425 0.7425 
legend * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01   
H0: the corresponding coefficient=1 
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Table 2.7  Pooled vs. pairwise: by size 
 
  
Model 2 
Regression method Pooled Pair wise 
Criteria of inv_spk 2X 2X 
Criteria of repo cut 10% 10% 
Cut methods 
  
No cut   (base outcome) 
Repo cut only     
    i.E(inv_spk)*size 
  
        small 1.17*** 1.14** 
        medium 1.13*** 1.12** 
        large 1.06 1.07 
    l.market_to_book 0.95*** 0.95*** 
    l.log_at 0.88*** 0.87*** 
    l.cash 0.51*** 0.51*** 
    l.cashflow 0.41*** 0.42*** 
    l.sale_growth 1.01 1.01 
    l.book_leverage_ratio 1.15*** 1.12*** 
    l.repo_yield 1.63e+4*** 15591.96*** 
    l.div_yield 0.26* 0.04*** 
    age 0.95*** 0.96*** 
    age2 1.00*** 1.00*** 
Div cut only 
  
    i.E(inv_spk)*size 
  
        small 1.06 1.05 
        medium 1.14** 1.15** 
        large 0.87** 0.87** 
    l.market_to_book 0.92*** 0.91*** 
    l.log_at 0.88*** 0.89*** 
    l.cash 2.21*** 2.31*** 
    l.cashflow 0.00*** 0.00*** 
    l.sale_growth 0.93** 0.94** 
    l.book_leverage_ratio 1.59*** 1.64*** 
    l.repo_yield 123.58*** 902.21*** 
    l.div_yield 3.66e+06*** 8.05e+06*** 
    age 0.93*** 0.93*** 
    age2 1.00*** 1.00*** 
Cut both     
    i.E(inv_spk)*size 
  
        small 1.39** 1.04 
        medium 1.16 0.98 
        large 0.99 0.93 
    l.market_to_book 0.67*** 0.57*** 
    l.log_at 0.79*** 0.77*** 
    l.cash 0.36*** 0.32*** 
    l.cashflow 0.00*** 0.00*** 
    l.sale_growth 0.98 0.97 
    l.book_leverage_ratio 2.32*** 2.42*** 
    l.repo_yield 1.54e+8*** 8.01e+10*** 
    l.div_yield 4.01e+7*** 4.98e+09*** 
    age 0.93*** 0.93*** 
    age2 1.00*** 1.00*** 
N 145482 N/A 
Pseudo R2 0.7426 N/A 
legend * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
H0: the corresponding coefficient=1 
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Table 2.8  Pooled vs. pairwise: by leverage 
  Model 3 
Regression method Pooled Pair wise 
Criteria of inv_spk 2X 2X 
Criteria of repo cut 10% 10% 
Cut methods 
  
No cut   (base outcome) 
Repo cut only 
  
i.E(inv_spk)*leverage 
  
        low 1.05 1.04 
        medium 1.19*** 1.18*** 
        high 1.10* 1.11* 
    l.market_to_book 0.95*** 0.95*** 
    l.log_at 0.88*** 0.87*** 
    l.cash 0.52*** 0.53*** 
    l.cashflow 0.38*** 0.42*** 
    l.sale_growth 1.01 1.01 
l.book_leverage_ratio 1.15*** 1.11*** 
    l.repo_yield 1.68e+4*** 15680.38*** 
    l.div_yield 0.38 0.04*** 
    age 0.95*** 0.96*** 
    age2 1.00*** 1.00*** 
Div cut only 
  
    i.E(inv_spk)*leverage 
  
        low 0.97 0.97 
        medium 0.96 0.96 
        high 1.08 1.04 
    l.market_to_book 0.92*** 0.91*** 
    l.log_at 0.88*** 0.88*** 
    l.cash 2.18*** 2.37*** 
    l.cashflow 0.00*** 0.00*** 
    l.sale_growth 0.93*** 0.94** 
    l.book_leverage_ratio 1.52*** 1.62*** 
    l.repo_yield 102.94*** 897.75*** 
    l.div_yield 2.68e+6*** 8.55e+06*** 
    age 0.93*** 0.93*** 
    age2 1.00*** 1.00*** 
Cut both     
    i.E(inv_spk)*leverage 
  
        low 1.07 0.91 
        medium 1.02 0.89 
        high 1.44*** 1.13 
    l.market_to_book 0.65*** 0.57*** 
    l.log_at 0.79*** 0.76*** 
    l.cash 0.33*** 0.34*** 
    l.cashflow 0.00*** 0.00*** 
    l.sale_growth 0.96 0.97 
    l.book_leverage_ratio 1.83*** 2.33*** 
    l.repo_yield 7.07e+7*** 7.80e+10*** 
    l.div_yield 1.24e+7*** 5.34e+09*** 
    age 0.94*** 0.93*** 
    age2 1.00*** 1.00*** 
N 145482 N/A 
Pseudo R2 0.7424 N/A 
legend * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
H0: the corresponding coefficient=1 
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Table 2.9  Pooled vs. pairwise: by age 
  Model 4 
Regression method Pooled Pairewise 
Criteria of inv_spk 2X 2X 
Criteria of repo cut 10% 10% 
Cut methods 
  
No cut   (base outcome) 
Repo cut only 
  
    i.E(inv_spk)*age 
  
        young 1.21*** 1.23*** 
        medium 1.06 1.04 
        mature 1.09* 1.08 
    l.market_to_book 0.95*** 0.95*** 
    l.log_at 0.88*** 0.87*** 
    l.cash 0.51*** 0.51*** 
    l.cashflow 0.41*** 0.42*** 
    l.sale_growth 1.01 1.01 
    l.book_leverage_ratio 1.14*** 1.12*** 
    l.repo_yield 1.65e+4*** 15816.31*** 
    l.div_yield 0.27* 0.04*** 
    age 0.95*** 0.96*** 
    age2 1.00*** 1.00*** 
Div cut only 
  
  i.E(inv_spk)*age 
  
        young 1.13* 1.13* 
        medium 0.95 0.95 
        mature 0.9 0.89* 
    l.market_to_book 0.92*** 0.91*** 
    l.log_at 0.88*** 0.88*** 
    l.cash 2.29*** 2.38*** 
    l.cashflow 0.00*** 0.00*** 
    l.sale_growth 0.93*** 0.94** 
    l.book_leverage_ratio 1.58*** 1.63*** 
    l.repo_yield 125.79*** 927.33*** 
    l.div_yield 3.79e+6*** 8.33e+06*** 
    age 0.94*** 0.94*** 
    age2 1.00*** 1.00*** 
Cut both     
  i.E(inv_spk)*age 
  
        young 1.34** 1.43* 
        medium 1.03 0.9 
        mature 1.06 0.88 
    l.market_to_book 0.67*** 0.57*** 
    l.log_at 0.78*** 0.76*** 
    l.cash 0.38*** 0.32*** 
    l.cashflow 0.00*** 0.00*** 
    l.sale_growth 0.98 0.97 
    l.book_leverage_ratio 2.30*** 2.41*** 
    l.repo_yield 1.55e+8*** 8.33e+10*** 
    l.div_yield 4.17e+7*** 4.74e+09*** 
    age 0.94*** 0.94*** 
    age2 1.00*** 1.00*** 
N 145482 N/A 
Pseudo R2 0.7426 N/A 
legend * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
H0: the corresponding coefficient=1 
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Table 2.10  Interaction with size, age, and leverage under the 1.5X criteria 
  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Criteria of inv_spk 1.5X 1.5X 1.5X 
Criteria of repo cut 10% 10% 10% 
Cut methods       
No cut (base outcome) 
Repo cut only       
  i.E(inv_spk)*size 
   
small 1.18*** 
  
medium 1.10** 
  
large 1.02 
  
    
  i.E(inv_spk)*age 
   
young 
 
1.16*** 
 
medium 
 
1.03 
 
mature 
 
1.07* 
 
    
  i.E(inv_spk)*leverage 
   
low  
  
1.02 
medium 
  
1.10** 
high     1.15*** 
Div cut only       
  i.E(inv_spk)*size 
   
small 0.97 
  
medium 1.04 
  
large 0.83*** 
  
    
  i.E(inv_spk)*age 
   
young 
 
1.05 
 
medium 
 
0.85*** 
 
mature 
 
0.87*** 
 
    
  i.E(inv_spk)*leverage 
   
low  
  
0.89** 
medium 
  
0.86*** 
high     1.03 
Div cut only       
  i.E(inv_spk)*size 
   
small 1.28* 
  
medium 1.11 
  
large 0.96 
  
    
  i.E(inv_spk)*age 
   young 
 
1.44*** 
 
medium 
 
1.02 
 
mature 
 
0.96 
 
    
  i.E(inv_spk)*leverage 
   
low  
  
0.98 
medium 
  
0.91 
high     1.39*** 
N 145482 145482 145482 
Legend * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
H0: the corresponding coefficient=1 
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CHAPTER 3   
FINANCIAL FUNDAMENTALS AND MARKET TIMING: WHEN A 
REPURCHASE IS NOT JUST A PAYOUT 
 
3.1. Abstract 
 
Previous literature has documented two stylized facts: (1) stock prices respond 
negatively to dividend cuts and positively to dividend increases, and (2) firms time the 
market when they repurchase. However, the correlation between these two facts has 
received little consideration. This study is among the first attempts to fill in this gap. 
Specifically, we develop a series of hypothesis tests to analyze the influence of dividend 
adjustments on firms’ market timing behavior. We find that firms with more information 
asymmetry, lower opportunity costs, or higher financial flexibility are more likely to 
increase repurchases after dividend cuts and decrease repurchases after dividend 
increases. That is, the market timing effects are more likely to dominate. On the other 
hand, both dividends and repurchases are signals of firms’ financial fundamentals and 
can be used to pay back when firms have strong positive cash flows. We find that for 
firms with less information asymmetry, higher opportunity costs, or lower financial 
flexibility, repurchases move in the same direction as dividends, and function mainly as a 
payout method to distribute redundant cash. That is, the financial fundamental effects are 
more likely to dominate. Finally, we show that these two effects are not incompatible. 
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Even if the financial fundamental effects dominate, firms still time the market: the 
internal rates of returns of their actual repurchases are higher than those of a pseudo 
smoothed repurchase strategy. 
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3.2. Introduction 
In the payout literature, the impact of dividend adjustments on share prices has been 
extensively analyzed. For example, Grullon, Michaely, and Swaminathan (2002) 
document a 3-day cumulative abnormal return of -3.74% for dividend cuts. Fracassi 
(2008) shows that the price increases by 0.71% on average in the three days following the 
announcement of a dividend increase. A plausible explanation for these findings is a 
signal hypothesis. Because of information asymmetry, a dividend adjustment serves as a 
signal to the market, revealing whether the firm has a sustainable profitability or not 
(Nissim and Ziv 2001). In order to maximize their present value
9
, firms do not cut 
dividends unless they are under extreme situations say, serious financial stress, nor do 
they increase dividends frequently, unless they believe this increase is sustainable (Brav 
et al. 2005). 
Another well-documented stylized fact is that firms time the market when they 
repurchase. Numerous studies have shown that firms tend to buy more when stocks are 
undervalued. These researchers find negative abnormal returns before repurchases, and 
positive abnormal returns after repurchases. (Ginglinger and Hammon 2007, Brockman 
and Chung 2001). In addition, Bonaime et al. (2014) find that the actual repurchases beat 
the smoothed (no timing) repurchase by 2% per year on average. 
In the present paper, we combine these two streams of the literature to hypothesize 
that firms might time the market when they cut or increase dividends. We explore the 
                                                   
9
 Unwarranted variability in stock prices can be regarded as risky, and having a negative effect on the present value 
of firms. 
64 
 
 
relationship between dividend adjustments and the market timing of repurchases
10
. We 
find that some firms take advantage of dividend adjustments to time the market, while 
others do not. To explain this phenomenon, we propose two mechanisms, namely, the 
market timing mechanism and the financial fundamental mechanism. 
Under the market timing mechanism, a cut in dividends presses the stock price down, 
giving the firm incentives to repurchase after the cut. By a similar logic, the firm would 
reduce repurchases following an increase in dividends. Hence, the market timing 
mechanism indicates that repurchases should move in the opposite direction of dividend 
adjustments. On the contrary, under the financial fundamental mechanism, the main 
function of repurchases is to distribute redundant cash instead of timing the market. Firms 
with spare cash will return it by repurchasing stock or increasing dividends, whereas 
firms short of cash will cut repurchases or dividends. Therefore, according to the 
financial fundamental mechanism, repurchases and dividend adjustments should move in 
the same direction. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we briefly review the two 
branches of the literature: (1) why and how the market responds to dividend increases and 
cuts, and (2) how firms time the market. Section 3 presents the data and variable 
construction. In section 4 we form hypotheses and explain the models. In section 5 we 
discuss the regression results, showing how firms use different repurchase strategies 
                                                   
10
 The argument applies to share issuing as well, but this paper only examines the repurchasing and reserves the market 
timing of issuing for future research. 
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depending on whether dividends are cut or increased. In section 6, we analyze the 
dynamics of price changes surrounding dividend adjustments, and relate it to repurchase 
strategies. Section 7 focuses on the robustness of the results. In section 8 we look at the 
price fluctuations surrounding dividend adjustments at the quarterly level, and relate them 
to repurchase dynamics. Section 9 evaluates the economic effects of timing. Finally, in 
section 10 we draw conclusions and discuss directions for future research. 
 
3.3. Literature Review 
3.3.1. Market responses to dividend adjustments 
Many researchers have documented that cuts and increases in dividends lead to 
share price shocks. Dhillon and Johnson (1994) find that the excess return is -2.01% for a 
dividend cut and 0.98% for a dividend increase in a two-day window. Grullon, Michaely, 
and Swaminathan (2002) estimate cumulative abnormal returns of -3.71% for a dividend 
cut and 1.34% for a dividend increase in a three-day window. Fracassi (2008) and Ali and 
Chowdhury (2010) report similar findings. Xiang (2016) finds that the market responses 
to dividend adjustment are also similar at quarterly intervals. All of the studies show that 
share prices fall after a dividend cut and rise after a dividend increase. Therefore, Brav, 
Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2005) claim in their survey that firms do not to cut 
dividends unless they are in extreme situations, say, serious financial stress, nor do firms 
increase dividends frequently, unless they believe this increase is sustainable.  
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Signaling is a plausible explanation of why the market responds to dividend changes. 
The dividend signaling hypothesis states that there is an information asymmetry problem 
between managers and the market. To mitigate this problem, firms use dividend 
adjustments to send signals to the market. An increase in dividends indicates a higher 
cash flow in the future, whereas a cut implies a lower cash flow (Nissim and Ziv 2001). 
In addition, it is difficult for bad firms to mimic good firms by paying dividends, because 
doing so is costly (John and Williams 1985), thereby making the signals mechanism 
effective. Therefore, only smaller and younger firms are in favor of such strategies 
(Adhikari, 2013). 
Later researchers provide more explanations for the signaling hypothesis. For 
example, Fama and French (2001) suggest that a firm has life cycles: growth stage, 
mature stage, and decline stage. An increase in dividends signals that the firm moves 
from the growth stage into the mature stage, which is represented by a stable cash flow 
and lower systematic risk. A cut in dividends signals that the firm changes from the 
mature stage into the decline stage, which is characterized by higher systematic risk and 
lower profitability. A limitation of the life cycle hypothesis is that it only applies to 
long-term cuts and increases. Firms may cut dividends for a certain periods when they are 
in difficult times, and recover (increase) dividends later. Under this situation, cuts or 
increases would convey little information about the life cycle. 
Some scholars argue that dividend decisions convey little information about future 
earnings (DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner 1996, Grullon, Benartzi, and Thaler 2005). 
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Instead, dividend changes are a signal of past earnings changes (Koch and Sun 2004). 
Regardless of the debates regarding past vs. future earnings, the effects on share prices 
are the same: the market typically responds positively to dividend increases and 
negatively to dividend cuts. After all, cuts are bad news, while increases are good.  
There are other explanations for the reaction of markets to dividend adjustments. For 
example, the agency cost hypothesis postulates that firms are characterized by agency 
costs: managers may invest in projects to favor themselves but with negative present 
value to shareholders (e.g., pet programs). An increase in dividends reduces the agency 
costs, thereby increasing the value of the firm, i.e., its stock price (Jensen 1986; 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz 2004). 
Fracassi (2008) tries to reconcile the signal hypothesis and the agent cost hypothesis. 
He finds that higher future earnings, catering to clientele, and reduction of agency 
problems are the main reasons for the positive market response to dividend increases, 
whereas transition of life cycle stages is the main explanation for the negative response to 
cuts. 
3.3.2. Repurchases and market timing 
When firms repurchase, they time the market. Because of information asymmetry, 
managers know their own firms better than the market. They repurchase when they 
believe the stock is undervalued
11
 (Ikenberry and Vermaelen 1996; Cook et al. 2004, 
                                                   
11
 Managers also issue new shares when they believe their stocks are overpriced, but stock issues are not investigated 
in the present study. 
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Chan and Lee 2007, De Cesari et al. 2012, Dittmar and Field 2015). The view of market 
timing is supported by two stylized facts: there are negative abnormal returns before 
repurchases, and positive abnormal returns after repurchases. For example, Stephen and 
Weisbach (1998) find that the average annual return is -1.1% for firms that announce a 
repurchase program instead of increasing dividends in the successive year. Ikenberry, 
Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) show that the average abnormal return is 12.1% after 
repurchase announcements. 
Some researchers further explore the factors that affect market timing, finding that 
information asymmetry is crucial. For example, De Cesari et al. (2012) claim that 
institutional ownership reduces the opportunities to time the market. Because institutional 
investors are sophisticated, they suffer less from information asymmetry. The managers’ 
timing skills are mixed. They may time the market over a short period of time, but 
repurchases are also clustered at market peaks, when prices are usually high (Dittmar and 
Dittmar 2008). The clustered repurchases indicate that firms’ timing behavior may be 
suboptimal, a view supported by Bonaime et al. (2014). Finally, poor market timing is 
correlated with indicators of poor corporate governance, such as low monitoring, few 
alternative uses of cash, inadequate earning management, and weak shareholder rights 
(Bonaime et al. 2014).  
Previous studies have focused on repurchase announcements or repurchase 
executions to determine the effect of repurchases. Repurchase announcements have been 
found to be followed by positive long-run abnormal returns (e.g., Ikenberry, Lakonishok, 
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and Vermaelen 1995). The execution of repurchases provides indirect evidence, usually 
related to information asymmetry, to support the activities of timing. For example, 
Brockman and Chung (2001) document that the stock liquidity is lower before the 
implementation of repurchases than after, indicating that managers take advantage of 
information asymmetry to time the market. Dittmar and Field (2015) use a similar 
method and find that firms repurchase at significant lower prices than the market average.  
 
3.4. Data and variable construction 
We use Compustat quarterly data from 1993 through 2012, for a total of 80 quarters. 
We choose quarterly instead of annual data because the higher frequency allows us to 
obtain more information about timing. The large number (80) of time series observations 
has the additional advantage of greatly reducing dynamic panel bias (Nickell 1981, 
Mudelsee 2001). 
We construct variables associated with firm characteristics and payouts. The 
variables measuring firm characteristics are cash, cash flow, sales growth, leverage ratio, 
market-to-book ratio (MB), size, investment ratio, dividend yield, repurchase yield, and 
age. Cash is computed as cash and short-term investment (CHEQ, item 36) divided by 
assets
12
 (ATQ, item 44). Cash flow is income before extraordinary items (IBQ, item 8) 
plus depreciation and amortization (DPQ, item 5), divided by assets. Sales growth is sales 
(SALEQ, item 2) in the current quarter minus sales in the previous quarter, divided by 
                                                   
12
 Unless specifically noted, asset is lagged by one quarter when used as denominator. 
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sales in the previous quarter. Leverage ratio is debt (DLTTQ+DLCQ, item 51+item 45) 
divided by assets. MB equals market assets (ATQ-CEQQ+CSHOQ*PRCCQ, item 
44-item 59+item 61*item 13) divided by assets. Size is the logarithm of assets. 
Investment ratio is investment (CAPXQ=CAPXY, or CAPXY minus lagged CAPXY if 
not in quarter 1, item 90 or item 90-lagged item 90 if not in quarter 1) divided by assets. 
Dividend yield equals dividends common/ordinary (DVQ=DVY, or DVY-lagged DVY if 
not in quarter 1) divided by assets. Repurchase yield equals purchase of common and 
preferred stock (PRSTKCQ=PRSTKCY or PRSTKCY-lagged PRSTKCY, item93 or 
item 93-lagged item 93 if not in quarter 1) divided by assets. Age is the number of 
quarters that a firm has been listed on Compustat. For firms already listed in 1993, we go 
back 12 years (back to 1981) to calculate the age. 
The payout variables are dividend cuts and dividend increases. A dividend cut is 
defined to occur in a quarter if the dividend per share (adjusted for splits) is smaller than 
in the previous 2 quarters and does not recover for at least 2 quarters. We require the cut 
to last at least 2 quarters to rule out “naïve cuts”13. The definition of a dividend increase 
is analogous. 
Financial institutions and utility firms (SIC 4400-4999, 6000-6999) are dropped 
from our sample because their operating characteristics are quite different from other 
firms. To prevent the results from being driven by a few outliers, we winsorize the data at 
                                                   
13
 Assume a firm pays dividends of $1, $1, $1.2, and $1 per share in quarters 1 through 4. This firm temporarily 
increases its dividends in quarter 3. A “naïve cut” occurs in quarter 4 because it is just a return to the historical dividend 
instead of a real cut. 
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the 0.5% level. The final sample consists of 13,444 firms and 493,741 firm-quarter 
observations.  
Table 3.1 summarizes descriptive statistics for the sample under study. Payouts 
prove to be quite popular among the firms in the sample, as repurchases occurred in 
19.98% of firm-quarters, and dividends were paid in 24.27% of firm-quarters (Panel B). 
Consistent with the literature, dividend adjustments, and cuts in particular, were not 
common: dividends were (net) increased in 11.5% of firm-quarters, and cut in only 1.9% 
of firm-quarters. 
 
3.5. hypotheses and estimation models 
In this section, we carry out a series of analyses to explore how firms adjust their 
repurchases after dividend cuts and increases. As discussed in the introduction section, it 
is hypothesized that firms’ repurchases after dividend cuts or increases can be explained 
by two mechanisms with contrasting implications: the market timing mechanism and the 
financial fundamental mechanism. Under the market timing mechanism, repurchases 
move in the opposite direction of dividend adjustments, whereas under the financial 
fundamental mechanism, repurchases move in the same direction as dividend adjustments. 
Our analysis below provides evidence that there are at least three factors affecting which 
mechanism dominates, namely, information asymmetry, opportunity cost of repurchases, 
and financial flexibility. The details are discussed next. 
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3.5.1. Information asymmetry: market timing vs. financial fundamentals 
Information asymmetry exists between firms and the market. When firms increase or 
reduce dividends, they send signals to the market (Nissim and Ziv 2001) that mitigate the 
asymmetry. The market responds to these signals, and the sensitivity of responses 
depends on the degree of information asymmetry. Therefore, for firms with greater 
information asymmetry, dividend adjustments lead to larger price shocks, creating more 
market timing opportunities. Under this situation, firms have stronger incentives to time 
the market, i.e., the market timing mechanism is more likely to dominate. 
On the other hand, dividend adjustments may be mostly driven by financial 
fundamentals, which may also affect repurchases. Firms with stable earnings and 
abundant cash may be more favorable toward increasing dividends and/or repurchasing 
stock to payout redundant cash. In contrast, firms facing financial problems and cash 
shortages might be pressured to cut dividends and/or repurchases. In summary, in this 
situation one would observe larger repurchases accompanied by increased dividends, and 
reduced repurchases accompanied by dividend cuts
14
. Therefore, the financial 
fundamental mechanism is more likely to dominate. 
Which of the two mechanisms dominates is therefore postulated to depend on the 
degree of information asymmetry, which can be measured by firm size
15
 (Vermaelen 
                                                   
14 Because repurchases are more flexible, firms show a payout hierarchy, tending to adjust repurchases before 
adjusting dividends (see Xiang and Lence, 2016). However, this phenomenon is not the focus of the present study. 
15 There are many proxies to measure information asymmetry, such as size, price volatility, trade volume, and leverage. 
Firms with small size, high price volatility, and low trade volume have more information asymmetry. Firms with high 
leverage ratios also have more information asymmetry, because their earnings’ volatility is magnified by leverage. 
Bid-ask spread, fat-tail of returns, institutional ownership, ownership concentration, board monitoring, news appearing 
on the newspaper in a year are also measures of information asymmetry. We only use size as our measurement of 
information asymmetry in the present study, and reserve the others for future research. 
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1981, Diamond and Verrecchia 1991). Therefore, we equally divide the sample into 
three groups according to firm size, and form our hypotheses as follows: 
H1-a: Small firms increase repurchases after dividend cuts and reduce repurchases 
after dividend increases. In contrast, large firms reduce repurchases after dividend cuts 
and increase repurchases after dividend increases. 
Hypothesis H1-a is tested by means of the regression on model (1): 
                                                                           
   (1) 
where repo is the repurchase yield, and Div_inc and Div_cut denote dummy variables for 
dividend increases and cuts respectively. Vector X comprises control variables, including 
lagged repurchase yield, dividend yield, log of assets, MB, leverage ratio, cash, cash flow, 
sales growth, investment ratio, and age. We also include a fixed effect, and quarter and 
year effects. Then we run separate regressions for the small- and the large-firm groups. 
According to model (1), a firm’s repurchase yield behavior in a particular quarter 
depends on whether the firm increased or cut dividends in the previous quarter. We 
incorporate only the slope effect because the payout in the current period is highly 
correlated with the payout in the previous period. In addition, the literature (Lintner 1956, 
Timmermann 1996) typically uses a self-adaptive model or its variations to capture the 
dynamics of payout, which only allows for slope changes. Lintner’s model (1956) is the 
most famous one among the examples. A more general model than (1) is (1-a), which 
allows for slope and intercept effects.  
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                                                                              (1-a)                              
We use this model as a robustness test and discuss it in section 6. 
As noted earlier, the large number of time series observations (80 observations) used 
for the estimation should greatly mitigate the problem of dynamic panel data bias 
(Nickell 1981, Mudelsee 2001). To reduce it even further, we employ the instrumental 
variable method. Specifically, we use           and        to estimate           and 
compute the estimated value, E(         ). Then, we replace all of the          ’s shown 
in the models by             , including both the stand-alone term and the interaction 
terms. Finally, we run the models as standard fixed-effect models. 
3.5.2. Opportunity cost to repurchase: market timing vs. financial fundamentals 
There is no free lunch to time the market, because the cash used to repurchase stock 
can be used to invest in other projects with positive net present values. Firms with more 
(less) profitable investment opportunities have higher (lower) opportunity costs to time 
the market. Therefore, the greater (smaller) the set of profitable investment opportunities 
a firm has, the more likely the financial fundamental (market timing) mechanism is to 
dominate. 
Adam and Goyal (2008) have shown that MB is the most informative proxy for the 
investment opportunity set. Assuming that a firm’s MB accurately reflects its profitable 
investment opportunities, we partition the sample into three groups of equal number of 
observations according to MB, and postulate the following hypothesis: 
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H1-b: Low-MB firms increase repurchases after dividend cuts and reduce 
repurchases after dividend increases. In contrast, high-MB firms increase repurchases 
after dividend increases and reduce repurchases after dividend cuts. 
We test hypothesis H1-b by means of model (1), estimated using the low- and 
high-MB subsamples. 
3.5.3. Financial flexibility: market timing vs. financial fundamentals 
Financial flexibility is a firm’s ability to take advantage of potential opportunities or 
deal with unexpected events. It determines whether a firm’s market timing strategy is 
feasible, because the firm must have enough cash to be able to repurchase stock
16
. 
If the market timing mechanism dominates, firms reduce their financial flexibility. 
The market timing mechanism implies that firms repurchase more (i.e., use cash) even if 
they are short of cash, and repurchase less (i.e., retain cash) even though they have 
abundant cash. On the contrary, if the financial fundamental mechanism dominates, firms 
improve their financial flexibility. Firms distribute more cash via repurchases when they 
have abundant cash, and reserve more cash by reducing repurchases when they have tight 
budgets. Therefore, the financial fundamental effect should dominate when the financial 
flexibility is low, and the market timing effect should prevail when the flexibility is high. 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2007) have shown that a firm’s financial flexibility can be 
measured by its leverage ratio. Accordingly, we partition the sample into three groups 
                                                   
16 Although sometimes a firm may borrow to repurchase, this strategy is risky because it increases the leverage ratio 
(Baker, Gallagher, and Morgan, 1981). 
76 
 
 
with the same number of observations based on the leverage ratio, and state the following 
hypothesis: 
H1-c: Low-leverage firms increase repurchases after dividend cuts and reduce 
repurchases after dividend increases. In contrast, high-leverage firms increase 
repurchases after dividend increases and reduce repurchases after dividend cuts. 
To test hypothesis H1-c, we estimate model (1) employing data for the low- and 
high-leverage subsamples. 
3.5.4. A cut is not always bad news: market timing vs. financial fundamentals 
In general, managers are reluctant to cut dividends, because the market responds 
negatively regardless of the reasons for the dividend cut (Brav et al. 2005, Bulan et al. 
2007). However, a dividend cut does not always need to be bad news. For example, an 
article in stockopedia.com
17
 asserts that a cut is good news when a firm has strong 
operating cash flow and low leverage. This view is supported by academic researchers. 
Bulan et al. (2007) show that dividend omission can be good news if a firm has strong 
fundamentals, say, low leverage ratio. Xiang and Lence (2014) find that firms might 
systematically cut dividends to finance large investments. The cuts in dividends due to 
large investments are different from general cuts and should be regarded as good news. 
Given that the market responds negatively to all dividend cuts, but not all cuts are 
driven by bad news, the gap between the market value and intrinsic value (known by 
managers) should tend to widen with “good” cuts, thus creating good opportunities for 
                                                   
17 http://www.stockopedia.com/content/dividend-cuts-are-they-always-bad-news-66531/ 
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firms to time the market. Based on this argument, and the evidence from Xiang and 
Lence (2014) suggesting that dividend cuts to finance large investment represent good 
news, we postulate the following hypothesis: 
H1-d: Small, low-MB, and low-leverage firms increase repurchases when dividend 
cuts are accompanied by large investments. In contrast, large, high-MB, and 
high-leverage firms reduce repurchases when dividend cuts are accompanied by large 
investments. 
We test hypothesis H1-d by means of model (2), which consists of model (1) 
expanded to incorporate an investment spike dummy and the interaction term: 
                                                            
              
                                                         (2)                                                     
where Inv_spk is a dummy for an investment spike. Following Xiang and Lence (2014) 
and Whited (2006), Inv_spk equals 1 if the investment ratio is at least two times larger 
than the median investment for the firm. The coefficient of interest is   , which 
corresponds to the interaction of the three variables:                           
         . Again, a more general model includes the dummies of cut, dcut and two other 
interaction terms, Div_cut*Inv_spk and repo*Inv_spk. We discuss these extensions in the 
section on robustness tests. 
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3.6. Results 
3.6.1. Market timing mechanism vs. Financial fundamental mechanism  
The regression results of model (1) comparing how firms adjust their repurchases 
after dividend cuts or increases are reported in Table 3.2. Firms are grouped by size 
(columns 2 and 3), MB ratio (columns 4 and 5), and leverage ratio (columns 6 and 7). As 
discussed before, we use these three variables to proxy for information asymmetry, 
opportunity cost, and financial flexibility, respectively. 
Columns 2 and 3 show how information asymmetry affects firms’ repurchase 
strategies. Small firms, characterized by greater information asymmetry, exhibit 
significant market timing behavior. They increase repurchases after a dividend cut by 
35.9% at a 0.1% significance level, and reduce repurchases after a dividend increase by 
12.1% at a 1% significance level. The changes to repurchases are not only statistically but 
also economically significant. In contrast, large firms, which face less information 
asymmetry, repurchase following a financial fundamental rule. They repurchase more 
after a dividend increase by 4% at a 5% significance level. They also reduce repurchases 
after a dividend cut, but the result is neither statistically (t=-0.74) nor economically 
significant (only 3%). These results are consistent with hypothesis H1-a. When 
information asymmetry does loom large, the market timing mechanism is more likely to 
prevail; otherwise, the financial fundamental mechanism is more likely to dominate. 
The next two columns report results regarding repurchases when firms face different 
opportunity costs. Low-MB firms, which have low opportunity costs, show market timing 
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behavior. They reduce repurchases after a dividend increase by 21.5% at a 0.1% 
significance level. They also increase repurchases after a dividend cut, but this change is 
neither statistically (t=0.03) nor economically significant (0.46%). In contrast, high-MB 
firms, which have high opportunity costs, increase their repurchases after a dividend 
increase by 5.3% at a 1% significance level. But we do not find significant effects after a 
dividend cut, as high-MB firms’ adjustment to repurchases after a dividend cut is neither 
statistically (t=0.6) nor economically significant (2.5%). Overall, these results provide 
evidence that after a dividend increase, the market timing mechanism is more likely to 
overshadow the financial fundamental mechanism among firms with low opportunity 
costs, and be overshadowed by the latter among firms with high opportunity costs. 
Neither mechanism outweighs the other for any firm group after a dividend cut. The 
reason is unclear. 
Results concerning the role of financial flexibility are reported in columns 6 and 7. 
Low-leverage firms have more financial flexibility, and show significant market timing 
behavior. They increase their repurchases after a dividend cut by 11.7% at a 5% 
significance level; they also increase repurchases after a dividend increase, but the 
increase is neither statistically (t=1.35) nor economically (3.18%) significant. A possible 
explanation for the latter result is that the market response is less sensitive to a dividend 
increase than to a dividend cut. 
In contrast, high-leverage firms repurchase following the financial fundamental rule. 
They increase repurchases after a dividend increase by 6.2% at a 1% significance level, 
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and reduce repurchases after a dividend cut (but the reduction is not statistically 
significant). This analysis shows that the market timing mechanism is more likely to 
dominate among high financial-flexibility firms in the case of dividend cuts, and the 
financial fundamental mechanism is more likely to prevail among low 
financial-flexibility firms in the case of dividend increases. 
To sum up, the above results are consistent with our hypotheses H1-a, H1-b, and 
H1-c. The market timing mechanism is more likely to dominate among firms with more 
information asymmetry, lower opportunity costs, and greater financial flexibility. In 
contrast, the financial fundamental mechanism is more likely to prevail for firms with 
less information asymmetry, higher opportunity costs, and lower financial flexibility. In 
the case of dividend cuts, no sub groups are dominated by the financial fundamental 
mechanism at any statistical significant level. We attribute this result to the payout cut 
hierarchy (Xiang and Lence 2014): firms tend to cut repurchases before they cut 
dividends. Hence, repurchases might have been cut to the target level ex ante, rather than 
cut ex post. 
3.6.2. When a cut is not bad news 
In this section, we analyze how firms adjust their repurchases when a dividend cut is 
not bad news, i.e., a dividend cut is accompanied by an investment spike. Results are 
reported in Table 3.3, whose columns are analogous to the columns in Table 3.2. The 
following table is provided to facilitate the comparison of the results from models (1), 
which does not control for the nature of the news, and (2), which does. The table shows 
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that the differential repurchase behavior following cuts becomes much stronger when 
controlling for the nature of the news.  
Table for comparison             
 Size  MB  Leverage  
 
Small Large   Low MB High MB   Low Leverage High Leverage 
Model 2 
        
repo*Div_cut*Inv_spk 0.755*** -0.375*** 
 
0.778** -0.243* 
 
0.196 -0.638*** 
 
(3.95) (-3.68) 
 
(2.75) (-2.11) 
 
(1.52) (-6.15) 
repo*Div_cut 0.224 -0.0107 
 
-0.139 0.0848 
 
0.0696 0.0381 
 
(1.94) (-0.24) 
 
(-0.84) (1.78) 
 
(1.06) (0.69) 
Model 1 
        
repo*Div_cut 0.359*** -0.0300 
 
0.0046 0.0250 
 
0.117* -0.0498 
 
(3.97) (-0.74)   (0.03) (0.60)   (2.11) (-1.08) 
 
Following a cut accompanied by an investment spike, small firms (i.e., firms with 
more information asymmetry) increase repurchases by 75.5% at a 0.1% significance level, 
which is more than double the 35.9% increase estimated without controlling for news 
(see Table 3.2). Similarly, low-MB firms (i.e., firms with low opportunity costs) increase 
share repurchases by 77.8% at a 1% significance level, compared to the statistically and 
economically insignificant increase (0.5%, t=0.03) estimate reported in Table 3.2. Finally, 
low-leverage firms (i.e., firms with high financial flexibility) increase repurchases by an 
economically significant level, 19.6%, although this coefficient is only statistically 
significant (t=1.52) at marginal level. Counter intuitively, the corresponding estimate 
without controlling for news shown in Table 3.2 is smaller (11.7%) but statistically 
significant (t=2.11). Succinctly, the market timing mechanism dominates for these firm 
groups, as the exhibit prominent timing behaviors, both from statistical and economic 
standpoints. 
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On the other hand, large firms (which are characterized by less information 
asymmetry) reduce repurchases by 37.5% at a 0.1% significance level following cuts 
accompanied by spikes, compared to an insignificant reduction of 3% with t=-0.74 
estimated without controlling for news (see Table 3.2). High-MB firms (i.e., firms with 
high opportunity costs) reduce repurchases by 24.3% at a 5% significance level, 
compared to an insignificant change of 2.5% with t=0.6. Finally, high-leverage firms (i.e., 
firms with low financial flexibility) reduce repurchases by 63.8% at a 0.1% significance 
level, compared to a 5% decrease with t=-1.08 computed without controlling for news. 
Importantly, neither of the three groups consisting of large, high-MB, and 
high-leverage firms exhibits statistically or economically significant repurchase 
adjustments when model (1) is fitted to them. However, all three groups show both 
economically and statistically significant repurchase adjustments under model (2), 
providing strong evidence that the fundamental mechanism dominates. 
The results lend strong support to Xiang and Lence (2016), who found that small 
firms are more likely to cut dividends to finance large investments, and large firms are 
reluctant to cut. The present study further shows that when it happens, firms may 
aggressively repurchase their undervalued shares in the following quarter
18
. If a dividend 
cut occurs with large investments, these firms might be substantially short of cash: the 
fundamental mechanism is more likely to dominate. 
                                                   
18
 A more comprehensive explanation is that firms want to mitigate the negative market response in addition to time 
the market. 
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To sum up, when dividend cuts are accompanied by large investments, the market 
timing mechanism is more likely to prevail among firms characterized by substantial 
information asymmetry, high opportunity costs, and high financial flexibility. These 
firms increase their repurchases aggressively after dividend cuts. In contrast, the financial 
fundamental mechanism is more likely to dominate among firms with less information 
asymmetry, high opportunity costs, and low financial flexibility. Such firms reduce their 
repurchases to reserve more cash.  
Finally, for firms with less information asymmetry, high opportunity costs, and low 
financial flexibility, the financial fundamental effect dominates in the case of 
investment-financing cuts, but not general cuts. A plausible explanation for this 
difference is that, in the case of a general cut (Table 3.2), firms might have already 
reduced repurchases to the target level before they cut dividends. In contrast, in the case 
of investment-financing cuts (Table 3.3), firms are less likely to precut repurchases to the 
target level, because the investment is lumpy and the cash shortage is substantial.  
3.6.3. Information asymmetry is everywhere 
In the previous discussion, we have argued that information asymmetry, opportunity 
cost, and financial flexibility affect firms’ market timing. Information asymmetry is 
represented by size, opportunity cost by the MB ratio, and financial flexibility by the 
leverage ratio. However, these characteristics are intertwined, and all of them affect the 
degree of information asymmetry. Their effects are sometimes in the same direction, and 
sometimes in the opposite direction. 
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For example, in addition to measuring opportunity costs, the MB ratio can be used 
as a proxy for information asymmetry. High-MB firms with high are likely to have more 
investment opportunities. The true values of these investment opportunities are usually 
known better by insiders than by the market. As a result, the information asymmetry is 
magnified by the investment opportunities. Some researchers use a firm’s MB ratio to 
measure the degree of information asymmetry in their analysis (McLaughlin, Safieddine, 
and Vasudevan 1998; Clarke and Shastri 2000). Therefore, the effect of MB ratio is 
complex: on the one hand, it indicates more information asymmetry, which favors market 
timing; on the other hand, it suggests more investment opportunities and consequently 
higher opportunity costs to time the market, which works against market timing. In our 
paper, opportunity costs determine whether it is worth for a firm to time the market, 
whereas information asymmetry affects how much its shares are mispriced (discussed in 
section VIII). 
Similarly, the leverage ratio measures financial flexibility, but it can also be used as 
a proxy for information asymmetry. First, it is difficult for firms with severe information 
asymmetry to borrow money (Xiang and Lence 2014); hence, these firms tend to have 
low leverage ratio
19
. Second, firms with high leverage ratio receive more supervision 
from the lending banks, thus mitigating the information asymmetry (Sufi 2007). Both 
arguments suggest that high-leverage firms have less information asymmetry problems.  
                                                   
19
 It is also difficult for these firms to get external financing from the equity market. But in general, these firms tend to 
have low leverage ratios. 
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Finally, other methods have been used by researchers to measure information 
asymmetry. For example, Elton, Gruber, and Gultekin (1984) use analysts’ forecast errors 
as a proxy for information asymmetry. If the forecast errors are large, the information 
asymmetry is high. Chung et al. (1995) adopt the bid-ask spread as a proxy for 
information asymmetry. Low bid-ask spreads indicate high market liquidity and more 
information communication, thus less information asymmetry. Additional methods to 
measure information asymmetry include the share concentration of insider holdings and 
institutional ownerships (Chiang and Venkatesh 1988). The present paper uses only firm 
size to control for information asymmetry, and reserves other methods for future 
research. 
3.7. Robustness Tests 
To assess the robustness of the results, the previous analysis was repeated under 
alternative model specifications. Adding intercept dummies for dividend increases and 
cuts (Div_inc and Div_cut, respectively) does not change the previous conclusions. Table 
3.4 reports the corresponding results for small and large firms, with and without control 
for investment spikes. In the case of model 1-a (see columns 2 and 3 of Table 3.4), small 
firms reduce repurchases by 16.3% with t=-2.98 after a dividend increase and reduce 
repurchases by 43.9% with t=3.84 after a dividend cut. In contrast, large firms increase 
repurchases by 4.01% with t=2.10. Regarding model 2-a (see columns 4 and 5 of Table 
3.4), small firms increase repurchases by 74.1% with t=3.86 when dividend cuts and 
investment occur at the same time. In contrast, larger firms reduce repurchases by 37.2% 
86 
 
 
with t=-3.64. The coefficients of the added intercept dummies (Div_inc and Div_cut) are 
not significant at any statistical level in either of the models. In summary, allowing for 
intercept changes does not alter the findings from the regressions run by firm size sub 
groups. 
Results are also robust to the addition of intercept dummies to the regressions fitted 
to the sub groups defined by MB and leverage ratio (tables are not reported in the interest 
of space). Further, the coefficients corresponding to the added terms are neither 
economically nor statistically significant, confirming that the original model 
specifications are acceptable. 
In addition, we repeat the previous analysis after allowing for 2 lags of repurchases 
(          and          )  as the instrumental variables for           . Similar to the 
other alternative specifications, the results are essentially unchanged compared to the 
original specification. Finally, we run the regressions after dropping all of the firms that 
have no dividend distributions or repurchases during the entire observation period (i.e., 
1992-2012). The total sample shrinks by 30% of firm-quarters, but the regression results 
are similar (tables omitted to save space). 
To sum up, our results are robust, regardless of the changes to model specifications 
or the number of lags used as instrumental variables.  
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3.8. Repurchase Dynamics 
In our previous discussion, we examine repurchases one quarter after the dividend 
cuts and increases. To shed more light on the market timing and fundamental financial 
mechanisms, we explore firms’ behavior over more quarters. For this purpose, we modify 
model (1) by allowing for more lags of the variables of interest, namely, Div_cut*repo 
and Div_inc*repo: 
                                     
 
                              
 
    
                                                                 (3) 
where k=1, 2, 3, and 4. An alternative model consists of: 
                                     
 
                              
 
    
                                                            (4) 
That is, in model (4) the interactions are the dividend events of k lags with the repurchase 
of one lag. Specification (3) is preferable
20
 because it better reflects the dynamics of 
repurchases; it uses quarter 0 as the base, thus comparing the repurchase changes in 
quarters 1, 2, 3, and 4 to the repurchases in quarter 0. 
   Figures 3.1 through 6 depict the point estimates of the regression coefficients 
corresponding to the interaction terms in model (3) (i.e.,     and     for k = 1, 2, 3, 
and 4), as a function of the quarters in which cuts or increases occur. The plots reveal 
three important facts. First, in most instances, the paired groups show opposite 
                                                   
20
 The results from fitting regression (4) are very similar to the results from model (3), and therefore not 
reported to save space. 
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repurchasing behavior in the quarter immediately after the dividend cuts/increases 
(figures 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, and 3.5). The difference between the market timing mechanism and 
the financial fundamental mechanism can be clearly appreciated from the spread between 
the curves. 
Second, the largest effect on repurchases typically occur immediately after the 
dividend cuts/increases. For example, in the quarter following dividend cuts, the 
difference between small- and large-size groups is approximately 40%, and the difference 
between low- and high-leverage groups is 17%. Similarly, the difference between low- 
and high-MB groups is almost 30% in the quarter after dividend increases. 
Third, the effects of dividend events fade out over time. Coefficient estimates tend to 
become smaller in magnitude and more similar between groups, converging after 3 or 4 
quarters. For example, after 3 quarters, the differences between the aforementioned 
paired groups become 2%, 4%, and 3%, respectively. These dynamics show that the 
timing activities mainly occur in the first or second quarters. 
 
3.9. Internal Rate of Return: How smart are these repurchases? 
3.9.1. Measure the timing effect 
In this section, we examine the internal rate of return (IRR) of the repurchases. This 
IRR is defined as the return such that the net present value of all the cash flows 
corresponding to repurchases equals to zero over the time window. In our case, a firm 
buys and holds shares from quarter 0 through 3 and sell all of them at the beginning of 
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quarter 4. We assume all repurchases and selling occur at the beginning of the 
corresponding quarter, and all the received dividends are reinvested to buy more shares 
immediately. In addition, dividend adjustments occur at the end of quarter -1 and right 
before the repurchases in quarter 0. The window analyzed comprises four quarters (i.e., 
five time points). The corresponding cash flows are: 
          ,  t=0, 1, 2, and 3 
                                                 
          
where    
           
        
 is the quarterly return of the stock at period i (not annualized), 
and i=1, 2, 3, and 4. We choose four instead of two or three quarters as the length of the 
window because it may take some time for stock prices to recover, and the repurchase 
will not turn out to be a smart buy unless the price recovers. We do not choose a window 
longer than four quarters because the timing opportunities generated by dividend cuts or 
increases might fade out with time. Figures 3.1 through 3.6 suggest that a four-quarter 
window is a good compromise. 
For each firm that repurchases after a dividend cut or increase, we form a smoothed 
non-timing strategy that a firm equally repurchases every quarter: 
     
 
 
      
 
   , t=0, 1, 2, and 3. 
    
 
 
      
 
                                  ) 
The IRR of this strategy is used as a benchmark. The timing effect is measured by the 
difference between the IRR of the actual repurchases and the IRR of the benchmark. 
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As before, we explore the relationships between the timing effect and factors 
including information asymmetry, opportunity costs, and financial flexibility. To analyze 
information asymmetry, we partition the sample into three groups with the same number 
of observations according to firm size. Similarly, we partition the sample into three 
groups based on MB to study the effect of opportunity costs, and into other three groups 
based on leverage ratio to explore financial flexibility. The values of firm size, MB, and 
leverage ratio used to separate the groups correspond to the quarter before a cut or an 
increase occurs (i.e., quarter -1). We examine the IRR of actual repurchases, the IRR of 
the smoothed repurchases, and the timing effect for the subgroups corresponding to the 
largest and smallest proxy values (i.e., the middle subgroups are dropped). The results are 
presented below. 
3.9.2. How large are the timing effects?  
Table 3.5 shows the actual IRRs, smoothed IRRs, and their difference. On average, 
all of the actual repurchases have positive net present values. The actual IRRs range from 
2.88% to 3.38% per quarter after dividend increases (Column 2, Panel A), and from 2.21% 
to 4.25% per quarter after dividend cuts (Column 2, Panel B). Most notably, every sub 
group beats the pseudo smoothed repurchase strategy. The timing effects 
(Actual-Smoothed IRR) range between 0.46% and 0.96% per quarter for dividend 
increases (Column 6, Panel A), and between 0.45% and 1.60% per quarter for dividend 
cuts (Column 6, Panel B). Only four out of twelve of t-statistics are not statistically 
significant at the 10% level. The timing effects are also economically significant. For 
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example, the smallest timing effect is 0.46% per quarter for the sub groups with t>1.64 
(low-MB sub group after dividend increases), which is equivalent to an annualized rate of 
1.85%. The largest timing effect is 1.60% per quarter (high-MB size sub group after a 
dividend cut), which is as high as 6.56% if annualized. We change the window length to 
2 quarters and repeat the analysis of IRR. The results are similar, but less significant 
(Table 3.6). A possible explanation is that a period of 2 quarters is too short to 
accumulate significant timing effects. 
The above results provide evidence of firms timing repurchases, supporting the view 
that repurchases are smart buys. This conclusion does not contradict our previous 
hypothesis, which states that financial fundamental effects dominate under some 
scenarios. These results simply suggest that firms time the market whenever possible, but 
they are more concerned about retaining cash when the fundamental mechanism 
dominates. The following table provides a hypothetical numerical example. 
Example: Timing effect, financial fundamental effect, and the mix 
  
Smoothed Repo 
Strategy  
Market Timing 
Strategy 
Financial Fundamental 
Strategy 
Mixed 
Strategy 
 
Net Quarterly Return Cash Flow 
 
Cash Flow 
 
Cash flow 
 
Cash Flow 
Q0 (div cut )   -10% -1 
 
-1 
 
-1 
 
-1 
Q1   3% -1 
 
-1.3 
 
-0.8 
 
-0.8 
Q2   3% -1 
 
-1.3 
 
-0.8 
 
-1.3 
Q3   3% -1 
 
-1.3 
 
-0.8 
 
-1.3 
Q4 
 
4.17 
 
5.12 
 
3.53 
 
4.58 
IRR 
 
1.64% 
 
1.85% 
 
1.46% 
 
1.68% 
Assume there is a dividend cut at the end of quarter 0. The net quarterly return drops 
to -10% (negative) for the quarter because of the cut, and recovers to 3% in the next 3 
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quarters, Q1, Q2, and Q3. Again, we assume that the firm repurchases shares at the 
beginning of quarters 0, 1, 2, and 3, and sell of them at the beginning of quarter 4. The 
IRR of a smoothed repurchase strategy is 1.64%. To execute a pure market timing 
strategy, the firm increases repurchases after the dividend cut and continues this increase 
for the next 3 quarters. The IRR of this strategy rises to 1.85%. Alternatively, the firm 
executes a pure financial fundamental strategy because it is short of cash, in which case 
the firm reduces repurchases over the next three quarters. The IRR of this strategy is 
1.46%, which is lower than 1.64%, the IRR of the smoothed strategy. However, when 
both mechanisms work at the same time, the firm uses a mixed strategy. It decreases the 
repurchases in Q2 to retain more cash, and recovers in Q3 and Q4 to time the market. The 
IRR is 1.68%, lower than that of a pure market timing strategy, but still higher than that 
of a smoothed strategy. The coexistence of the market timing and the financial 
fundamental mechanisms helps explain why firms’ repurchases might be sub-optimal and 
clustered at market peaks (Bonaime et al. 2014).  
 
3.10. Conclusions 
The literature has documented two stylized facts: (1) stock prices respond negatively 
to dividend cuts and positively to dividend increases, and (2) firms repurchase more when 
stock prices are low and less when prices are high, i.e., time the market. We put these two 
facts together, and examine firms’ repurchase behavior after dividend cuts and increases. 
We find that firms’ repurchase behavior is affected by both a market timing mechanism 
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and a financial fundamental mechanism. According to the market timing mechanism, 
firms’ repurchases move in opposite direction of dividend adjustments because share 
prices co-move with the dividend adjustments, thereby providing incentives for firms to 
time the market. In contrast, in the case of the financial fundamental mechanism, firms’ 
repurchases move in the same direction as dividend adjustments. The explanation for this 
behavior is that dividend adjustments reveal firms’ financial fundamentals, and firms 
manage repurchases and dividends to maintain their cash at a desired level.  
Which mechanism is the most important one depends on at least three factors: 
information asymmetry, opportunity cost, and financial flexibility. When the information 
asymmetry is severe, stock prices are likely to be more responsive to changes in 
dividends, thereby providing firms with more opportunities to time the market. Low 
opportunity costs are more conducive to market timing, because firms have less to lose 
by using their cash to time the market instead of investing in alternative projects, such as 
expanding production. Firms with high financial flexibility have the cash needed to time 
the market. Therefore, for firms with more information asymmetry, low opportunity costs, 
and high financial flexibility, the market timing mechanism is more likely to dominate. 
Contrastingly, for firms with less information asymmetry, high opportunity costs, and 
low financial flexibility, the fundamental mechanism is more likely to prevail.  
Using firm size to proxy for information asymmetry, MB ratio to proxy for 
opportunity cost, and leverage ratio to proxy for financial flexibility, we find evidence 
consistent with our hypothesis. The market timing mechanism dominates as small firms 
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and low-leverage-ratio firms increase repurchases after dividend cuts, and as small firms 
and low-MB firms reduce repurchases after dividend increases. In comparison, the 
financial fundamental mechanism dominates as large firms, high-MB firms, and 
high-leverage firms increase repurchases after dividend increases. In a few instances, 
neither mechanism outweighs the other, but none of them statistically contradicts our 
hypothesis. 
The information asymmetry is magnified when firms cut dividends to finance large 
lumpy investments. The market tends to regard dividend cuts as bad news in general, but 
this investment-financing cut is not bad news because the firm is expanding. We find that 
small and low-leverage firms aggressively increase repurchases after this kind of 
dividend cuts, i.e., the market timing mechanism prevails. In contrast, large, high-MB, 
and high-leverage firms substantially reduce their repurchases, i.e., the financial 
fundamental effect is more important. 
We use the difference in the internal rates of return for the actual and the smoothed 
repurchases to measure the market timing effect. We find that all firms exhibit positive 
timing skills, even those firms for which the financial fundamental effect dominates their 
repurchase activities. However, the magnitude of the latter firms’ timing effect is smaller, 
especially when the event is a dividend cut. The sensitivity of market responses to 
dividend adjustment is the key. 
Our paper is the first to rigorously study the repurchase activities surrounding 
dividend cuts and increases. To examine the market timing behavior, we use dividend 
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cuts and increases as proxies for stock under/over valuation. This method starts a new 
research area. For example, future researchers might study equity issuance after dividend 
cuts and increases. Because equity issuances are the opposite of repurchases, market 
timing and financial fundamental status are still the two major factors that should affect 
managers’ decisions. The two mechanisms we propose are not new, but we are the first to 
treat them as a mix in the repurchase literature. By considering them together, it is easier 
to explain many phenomena. For example, our findings help explain why some firms 
increase repurchases while other reduce repurchases. They also help explain why 
repurchases are only sub optimal (Bonaime et al. 2014). In this sense, our research lends 
support not only to the literature on payout policies, but also to the literature about market 
microstructure. 
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Appendix A: Tables 
 
Table 3.1 Descriptive statistics 
   
Panel A   Firm characteristics       
Variable n Mean Min Median Max 
Cash 493,741 0.183 0 0.081 2.602 
CashFlow 493,741 0.029 0 0.022 0.305 
SalesGrowth 493,741 0.329 -1 0.081 16.75 
Leverage 493,741 0.283 0 0.191 8.619 
MB 493,741 2.38 0.20 1.41 102.50 
Asset 493,741 4.71 -3.69 4.64 10.65 
Investment 493,741 0.018 0 0.009 0.028 
Dividend 493,741 0.002 0 0 0.050 
   Dividend > 0 130,944 0.007 4.82E-08 0.004 0.050 
Repurchase 493,741 0.003 0 0 0.090 
   Repurchase > 0 94,747 0.014 4.85E-08 0.005 0.090 
Age 493,741 47.75 5 40 157 
Cash 493,741 0.183 0 0.081 2.602 
Total quarters 80 qtrs 
  
Total firms 13444     
     
Panel B      Positive payout 
  
 
obs. % of total obs 
  
Dividend > 0 and Repurchase > 0 44,008 8.91% 
  
Dividend > 0 and Repurchase = 0 86,936 17.61% 
  
Dividend = 0 and Repurchase > 0 50,739 10.28% 
  
Dividend = 0 and Repurchase = 0 312,058 63.20% 
  
Total 493,741 100.00% 
  
     
Panel C     Payout adjustments 
  
  obs. %(gross) 
  
Cut 2,550 0.52% 
  
Increase 13,342 2.70% 
  
No change in dividends 477,849 96.78% 
  
Total 493,741 100% 
  
  
Panel D. Dividend cuts and increases by firm groups 
Dividend Total Size Group  MB Group  Leverage Group 
Adjustments  Small Large  Low High  Low High 
Cut Observ. 2,550 223 1,503  1,165 456  686 944 
 (%) 0.52% 0.05% 0.30%  0.24% 0.09%  0.14% 0.19% 
           
Increase Observ. 13,342 428 10,226  2,059 5,320  3,330 3,757 
 (%) 2.70% 0.09% 2.07%  0.42% 1.08%  0.67% 0.76% 
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Table 3.2 Repurchases surrounding div cuts and increases 
 
The regression model is:  
 
                                                                               
(1)
 
 
where repo is the repurchase yield, and Div_inc and Div_cut denote dummy variables for 
dividend increases and cuts respectively. Vector X comprises control variables, including 
lagged repurchase yield, dividend yield, logarithm of assets, MB, leverage, cash, cash 
flow, sales growth, investment ratio, and age. We also include a fixed effect, and quarter 
and year effects. We also include a fixed effect, and quarter and year effects. We partition 
the sample into three groups by size, MB, and leverage ratio (each with the same number 
of observations), and drop the middle group. Then we run the regression on each group. 
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Table 3.2 Repurchases surrounding div cuts and increases 
 
Size 
 
Market to Book Ratio 
 
Leverage Ratio 
  Small Large   Low MB High MB   
Low 
Leverage 
High 
Leverage 
repo*increase -0.121** 0.0407** 
 
-0.215*** 0.0526** 
 
0.0318 0.0620** 
 
(-2.63) (2.76) 
 
(-4.84) (3.18) 
 
(1.35) (3.18) 
         repo*cut 0.359*** -0.0300 
 
0.00461 0.0250 
 
0.117* -0.0498 
 
(3.97) (-0.74) 
 
(0.03) (0.60) 
 
(2.11) (-1.08) 
         repo_yield 0.555*** 0.658*** 
 
0.345*** 0.630*** 
 
0.588*** 0.681*** 
 
(26.36) (65.67) 
 
(11.36) (60.09) 
 
(49.00) (38.44) 
         MB 2.4300E-06 0.00020*** 
 
0.00051*** 0.000023** 
 
0.0000152 0.00000789 
 
(0.48) (4.91) 
 
(3.47) (2.64) 
 
(1.08) (1.07) 
         leverage 0.00000083 -0.0078*** 
 
-0.0011*** -0.0000901 
 
-0.0124*** -0.000186** 
 
(0.02) (-23.09) 
 
(-8.14) (-1.12) 
 
(-4.59) (-3.28) 
         log_asset 0.000148** 0.00073*** 
 
0.000128** 0.00063*** 
 
0.00119*** -0.0000667 
 
(2.95) (7.49) 
 
(2.67) (8.03) 
 
(14.50) (-1.15) 
         cash 0.000542*** 0.00583*** 
 
0.00381*** 0.00089*** 
 
0.00180*** 0.000309 
 
(4.61) (13.70) 
 
(16.87) (4.64) 
 
(9.01) (1.37) 
         cashflow 0.00201** 0.00609** 
 
0.00367*** 0.00580*** 
 
0.00230 0.00249* 
 
(2.81) (2.66) 
 
(3.61) (4.27) 
 
(1.64) (2.31) 
         sale_growth -0.0000286 -0.000149* 
 
-0.000059* -0.000051* 
 
-0.0000546 0.00000596 
 
(-1.96) (-2.32) 
 
(-2.45) (-1.98) 
 
(-1.87) (0.26) 
         investment_ratio -0.00306** -0.00993*** 
 
-0.00376*** -0.00856*** 
 
-0.0101*** -0.00247* 
 
(-2.91) (-4.60) 
 
(-3.37) (-4.42) 
 
(-4.30) (-2.20) 
         age 0.0000281 0.0000295 
 
0.000137 0.0000513 
 
0.000101 -0.000146 
 
(0.20) (0.13) 
 
(0.82) (0.20) 
 
(0.41) (-0.92) 
         div_yield -0.00383 0.00658 
 
-0.00532 0.0123 
 
-0.00576 -0.0140 
 
(-0.58) (0.70) 
 
(-0.75) (1.28) 
 
(-0.66) (-1.58) 
                  
N 103907 117545 
 
112448 106726 
 
109459 110018 
         t statistics in parentheses 
       
       * p<0.05     ** p<0.01     *** p<0.001" 
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Table 3.3  Repurchases surrounding dividend cuts & increases with investment 
spikes 
 
The regression model is:  
                                                                            
                            
              
                        
 
                   
(2) 
                                       
where Inv_spk is a dummy for an investment spike. Following Xiang and Lence (2014) 
and Whited (2006), Inv_spk equals 1 if the investment ratio is at least two times larger 
than the median investment for the firm. The coefficient of interest is   , which 
corresponds to the interaction of the three variables:                           
         . 
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Table 3.3 Repurchases surrounding div. cuts & increases with investment spikes 
 
Size 
 
Market to Book Ratio 
 
Leverage Ratio 
Variable Small Large   Low MB High MB   
Low 
Leverage 
High Leverage 
Repo*Div_cut*Inv_spk 0.755*** -0.375*** 
 
0.778** -0.243* 
 
0.196 -0.638*** 
 
(3.95) (-3.68) 
 
(2.75) (-2.11) 
 
(1.52) (-6.15) 
         Investment_spike -0.000153* -0.000293* 
 
-0.000129 -0.000302* 
 
-0.000353** 0.0000968 
 
(-2.20) (-2.00) 
 
(-1.77) (-2.37) 
 
(-2.88) (1.07) 
         repo*Div_inc -0.118* 0.0399** 
 
-0.209*** 0.0540** 
 
0.0311 0.0627** 
 
(-2.56) (2.71) 
 
(-4.69) (3.26) 
 
(1.32) (3.20) 
         repo*Div_cut 0.224 -0.0107 
 
-0.139 0.0848 
 
0.0696 0.0381 
 
(1.94) (-0.24) 
 
(-0.84) (1.78) 
 
(1.06) (0.69) 
         repo_yield 0.552*** 0.657*** 
 
0.331*** 0.630*** 
 
0.586*** 0.680*** 
 
(26.18) (65.62) 
 
(10.89) (60.05) 
 
(48.87) (38.41) 
         MB 0.00000280 0.000199*** 
 
0.000528*** 0.0000231** 
 
0.0000169 0.00000780 
 
(0.56) (5.00) 
 
(3.63) (2.70) 
 
(1.19) (1.06) 
         leverage -0.00000209 -0.00783*** 
 
-0.00106*** -0.0000956 
 
-0.0125*** -0.000183** 
 
(-0.05) (-23.08) 
 
(-8.25) (-1.19) 
 
(-4.60) (-3.23) 
         log_asset 0.000155** 0.000730*** 
 
0.000128** 0.000640*** 
 
0.00120*** -0.0000679 
 
(3.07) (7.47) 
 
(2.67) (8.13) 
 
(14.61) (-1.17) 
         cash 0.000550*** 0.00585*** 
 
0.00382*** 0.000882*** 
 
0.00180*** 0.000306 
 
(4.68) (13.75) 
 
(16.93) (4.66) 
 
(9.01) (1.35) 
         cashflow 0.00205** 0.00628** 
 
0.00368*** 0.00585*** 
 
0.00237 0.00251* 
 
(2.86) (2.74) 
 
(3.63) (4.31) 
 
(1.69) (2.33) 
         sale_growth -0.0000279 -0.000150* 
 
-0.0000595* -0.0000503 
 
-0.0000528 0.00000494 
 
(-1.91) (-2.33) 
 
(-2.49) (-1.95) 
 
(-1.81) (0.22) 
         investment_ratio -0.00185 -0.00701** 
 
-0.00278* -0.00580** 
 
-0.00617* -0.00307* 
 
(-1.53) (-2.78) 
 
(-2.18) (-2.59) 
 
(-2.26) (-2.35) 
         age 0.0000287 0.0000306 
 
0.000141 0.0000458 
 
0.0000992 -0.000144 
 
(0.20) (0.14) 
 
(0.84) (0.18) 
 
(0.40) (-0.91) 
         div_yield -0.00286 0.00806 
 
-0.00517 0.0121 
 
-0.00555 -0.0115 
  (-0.43) (0.86)   (-0.73) (1.26)   (-0.63) (-1.30)   
N 103907 117545 
 
112448 106726 
 
109459 110018 
t statistics in parentheses 
       
* p<0.05     ** p<0.01     *** p<0.001 
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Table 3.4 Model Specification & Robustness 
In the regression model for columns 2 and 3, we add                               to 
model (1), allowing for changes in both the intercept and the slopes.  
                                                                    
                                                            
(1-a) 
Similarly, in the regression model for columns 4 and 5, we add                
               to model (2), allowing for changes in both the intercept and the slopes.  
                                                                          
               
                                                              
      
(2-a) 
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Table 3.4 Model Specification & Robustness 
 
No control for inv. spikes 
 
Control for inv. spikes 
Variable Small Large   Small Large 
D_repo*cut*inv_spk 
   
0.741*** -0.372*** 
    
(3.86) (-3.64) 
      D_investment_spike 
   
-0.000152* -0.000293* 
    
(-2.19) (-2.00) 
      repo*increase -0.163** 0.0401* 
 
-0.121* 0.0472* 
 
(-2.98) (2.10) 
 
(-2.25) (2.51) 
      repo*cut 0.439*** -0.0293 
 
0.303* -0.0195 
 
(3.84) (-0.60) 
 
(2.23) (-0.37) 
      repo_yield 0.614*** 0.684*** 
 
0.551*** 0.657*** 
 
(28.18) (67.90) 
 
(26.04) (65.28) 
      market_to_book 0.00000383 0.000226*** 
 
0.00000286 0.000199*** 
 
(0.69) (5.35) 
 
(0.57) (5.01) 
      book_leverage_ratio -0.00000376 -0.00787*** 
 
-0.00000179 -0.00784*** 
 
(-0.08) (-22.33) 
 
(-0.04) (-23.10) 
      log_at 0.000153** 0.000732*** 
 
0.000157** 0.000733*** 
 
(2.82) (7.25) 
 
(3.11) (7.49) 
      cash 0.000549*** 0.00612*** 
 
0.000551*** 0.00585*** 
 
(4.33) (13.83) 
 
(4.69) (13.75) 
      cashflow 0.00164* 0.00440 
 
0.00206** 0.00634** 
 
(2.15) (1.85) 
 
(2.88) (2.77) 
      sale_growth -0.0000318* -0.000142* 
 
-0.0000280 -0.000149* 
 
(-1.96) (-2.08) 
 
(-1.92) (-2.32) 
      inv_ratio -0.00307** -0.00928*** 
 
-0.00185 -0.00700** 
 
(-2.70) (-4.15) 
 
(-1.54) (-2.78) 
      age 0.0000690 -0.0000509 
 
0.0000291 0.0000324 
 
(0.44) (-0.22) 
 
(0.21) (0.14) 
      dv_yield -0.00360 0.00736 
 
-0.00169 0.00938 
 
(-0.50) (0.76) 
 
(-0.25) (0.99) 
      D_dv_increase 0.000209 -0.000137 
 
-0.00000194 -0.000157 
 
(0.61) (-0.71) 
 
(-0.01) (-0.83) 
      D_dv_cut -0.000755 0.0000441 
 
-0.000887* 0.000139 
  (-1.89) (0.15)   (-2.25) (0.49) 
N 97812 114207 
 
103907 117545 
      t statistics in parentheses * p<0.05     ** p<0.01     *** p<0.001 
  
 
 
Table 3.5 Internal Rate of Return (IRR) and Timing Effect (4 quarters) 
Panel A Internal rate of returns after a dividend increase 
 
IRR of Actual Repurchases 
 
IRR of Smoothed Repurchases 
 
Timing Effect 
 
   (Dividend Increases)    (Dividend Increases)   Diff.in IRR (Actual-Smoothed)   
Group Mean Std.Dev.   Mean Std.Dev.   Mean Std.Dev. t Obs. 
small 3.38% 9.76%   2.78% 8.64%   0.60% 5.54% 1.40  166 
large 3.15% 9.63% 
 
2.48% 8.06% 
 
0.67% 4.81% 10.18  5341 
           
low_mb 2.90% 11.27% 
 
2.44% 9.48% 
 
0.46% 5.69% 2.49  951 
high_mb 2.94% 9.38% 
 
2.13% 7.80% 
 
0.81% 4.96% 8.63  2795 
           
low_lever 3.08% 9.98% 
 
2.12% 8.29% 
 
0.96% 5.19% 7.54  1661 
high_leve 2.88% 10.61%   2.27% 9.02%   0.61% 5.47% 4.43  1581 
           
Panel B Internal rate of return after a dividend cut 
 
IRR of Actual Repurchases 
 
IRR of Smoothed Repurchases 
 
Timing Skills 
 
   (Dividend Cuts)    (Dividend Cuts)   Diff.in IRR (Actual-Smoothed)   
Group Mean Std.Dev.   Mean Std.Dev.   Mean Std.Dev. t Obs. 
small 3.24% 10.77% 
 
2.16% 9.11% 
 
1.08% 5.85% 1.63  78 
large 3.28% 13.03% 
 
2.72% 10.70% 
 
0.56% 7.07% 1.75  487 
           
low_mb 3.12% 13.67% 
 
2.70% 11.01% 
 
0.42% 9.00% 0.77  271 
high_mb 4.25% 12.26% 
 
2.65% 9.65% 
 
1.60% 6.44% 3.47  195 
           
low_lever 2.98% 11.35% 
 
2.28% 9.53% 
 
0.70% 6.86% 1.68  272 
high_lever 2.21% 15.96%   1.79% 12.81%   0.45% 9.16% 0.71  211 
 
   
1
0
8
 
  
 
 
Table 3.6 Internal Rate of Return (IRR) and Timing Effect (2 quarters) 
Panel A Internal rate of returns after a dividend increase 
  IRR of Actual Repurchases   IRR of Smoothed Repurchases   Timing Skills   
Group Mean Std.Dev.   Mean Std.Dev.   Mean Std.Dev. T  Obs. 
small 3.10% 14.93% 
 
3.08% 12.66% 
 
0.01% 6.70% 0.02  144 
large 2.90% 12.09% 
 
2.38% 11.03% 
 
0.52% 4.35% 8.38  4915 
          
 
low_mb 3.33% 14.60% 
 
2.92% 13.14% 
 
0.41% 5.59% 2.12  835 
high_mb 2.76% 11.59% 
 
2.13% 10.57% 
 
0.63% 4.21% 7.62  2591 
           
low_lever 2.76% 12.18% 
 
2.01% 11.11% 
 
0.75% 4.52% 6.34  1461 
high_lever 2.81% 12.48%   2.30% 11.40%   0.52% 5.22% 3.78  1439 
           
Panel B Internal rate of return after a dividend cut 
  IRR of Actual Repurchases   IRR of Smoothed Repurchases   Timing Skills   
Group Mean Std.Dev. 
 
Mean Std.Dev. 
 
Mean Std.Dev. t Obs. 
small 0.19% 13.99% 
 
-0.17% 12.97% 
 
0.36% 3.72% 0.76  61 
large 3.68% 21.10% 
 
3.26% 16.45% 
 
0.42% 10.06% 0.83  391 
           
low_mb 4.16% 25.06% 
 
3.18% 18.30% 
 
0.98% 12.50% 1.13  208 
high_mb 2.84% 14.23% 
 
2.72% 12.48% 
 
0.12% 5.23% 0.29  155 
           
low_lever 1.86% 13.71% 
 
1.56% 12.92% 
 
0.29% 4.85% 0.88  216 
high_lever 4.08% 26.84%   3.31% 19.13%   0.78% 13.87% 0.74  174 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
0
9
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Appendix B: Figures 
 
Figures 3.1-3.6: Repurchase % Changes after Dividend Increases/Cuts  
Quarter 0 is the quarter that dividend cuts or increases occur 
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Figure 3.1 
Repo. % Changes after Div. Cuts (by Size) 
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Repo. % Changes after Div. Inc. (by Size) 
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Repo. % Changes after Div. Cuts (by MB) 
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Repo. % Changes after Div. Inc. (by MB) 
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Repo. % Changes after Div Cuts (by leverage) 
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Repo. % Changes after Div. Inc. (by leverage) 
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Appendix C: Dynamic panel bias 
Our models have the problem of dynamic panel bias, and we mitigate it in this 
session. Dynamic panel bias exists when the lagged depended variable appears on the 
right hand side of a fixed effect model (Nickell,1981). Consider a model with fixed 
effect: 
                             
To remove the fixed effect   , differentiate it: 
                                                            
When using the OLS method to regress on this equation, the regressor               and 
the error term             are not independent, because        and        are correlated. 
Therefore, the estimation is biased, and this is called a “dynamic panel bias”. Nickell 
(1981) shows that the bias is 
    
   
       
      
   
 
where n is the number of units, T is the time span,   is the true value of the coefficient, 
and    is the estimate of   using a naïve estimation. The bias does not go away as n 
goes large, but becomes small as T goes large. To remove the correlation between 
              and            , Anderson and Hsiao (1982) use an instrumental method 
(IV). Candidates for        can be              , and more lags. Arellano and Bond 
(1991) suggest a generalized method of moments (GMM), which is more efficient than 
the IV method. Blundell and Bond (1998) discussed the initial conditions and moment 
restrictions of the GMM and further refine the estimation. 
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We use the IV method instead of the GMM or the method proposed by Blundell and 
Bond, because our model is not a standard linear model discussed in their research. Our 
models include not only the lagged term            but also its interaction terms such as 
                   . The methods advocated by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell 
and Bond (1998) are not applicable. Specifically, we use           and        to 
estimate          , and get the estimated value, E(          . Then, we replace all the 
         ’s shown in the models by             , including both the stand-alone term 
and the interaction terms. Finally, we run the models as standard fixed effect models.  
